Political Constructivism and Reasoning About Peremptory Norms of International Law by Costelloe, Daniel G.
Washington University Jurisprudence Review
Volume 4 | Issue 1
2011
Political Constructivism and Reasoning About
Peremptory Norms of International Law
Daniel G. Costelloe
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Washington University Jurisprudence Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel G. Costelloe, Political Constructivism and Reasoning About Peremptory Norms of International Law, 4 Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 1
(2011).
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Washington University 
Jurisprudence Review 
 
VOLUME 4 NUMBER 1 2011   
 
POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND 
REASONING ABOUT PEREMPTORY NORMS  
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
DANIEL G. COSTELLOE
 
ABSTRACT 
All currently accepted peremptory norms of general international law 
represent principles that are of fundamental importance to the 
international community. Courts and tribunals often refer to an 
international legal norm’s fundamental importance to the international 
community when identifying it as a norm that gives rise to peremptory 
legal consequences. This Article explores the potential of social contract 
theory and of political constructivism more generally as an approach to 
understanding what it means to say that a legal norm, particularly a 
human rights norm, is of fundamental importance to the international 
community. Taking John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples as a starting point 
for this line of inquiry, the paper investigates whether social contract 
methods can shed light on those fundamental principles and policies that 
enjoy special protection through peremptory legal consequences in 
international law. 
 
 
  Ph.D. candidate in law, Gonville & Caius College, University of Cambridge; LL.M., Harvard 
Law School; LL.B., University College London. This Article is a substantially revised version of the 
paper submitted in fulfillment of the LL.M. degree at Harvard Law School. The original paper was 
written under the supervision of Professor Frank Michelman, to whom I am indebted for many useful 
comments on earlier drafts. I also extend my special thanks to Professor Alyssa Bernstein for her very 
helpful comments on this Article.  
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INTRODUCTION 
―Peremptory norm‖ is a technical term in international law that 
describes a particular range of legal consequences associated with a small 
group of international legal norms. These consequences notably include 
non-derogability and particular consequences in the law of state 
responsibility. The term has, in less technical usage, become associated 
with those substantive rules and principles of international law that are of 
fundamental importance to the international community, since peremptory 
legal consequences are available in order potentially to safeguard those 
rules and principles that are fundamental because of their subject-matter. 
Peremptory norms—also referred to collectively as the jus cogens1—
impose negative obligations on states to refrain from certain forms of 
conduct. A breach of such an obligation gives rise to ―peremptory‖ legal 
consequences. These peremptory legal consequences, among other things, 
deprive treaties and other transactions that derogate from one or more 
peremptory norm(s) of their legal validity and give rise to particular 
effects in the law of state responsibility, at least in the event of a serious 
breach, according to the conception of state responsibility put forward by 
the International Law Commission in its 2001 Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
2
 The doctrine 
of jus cogens has by now long been very widely accepted as a legal 
concept in international law.
3
 The precise range of its legal consequences 
however remains uncertain.
4
 
 
 
 1. This Article uses the terms ―peremptory norms‖ and ―jus cogens‖ more or less 
interchangeably, since this has become common usage in international law literature. Strictly speaking 
however the term ―peremptory norm‖ refers to the particular range of legal consequences associated 
with this type of international legal norm, whereas the term ―jus cogens‖ (or ―the jus cogens‖) more 
accurately refers to the body of peremptory international law that these norms collectively constitute. 
 2. See, e.g., State Responsibility: Report for the International Law Commission on the Work of 
Its Fifty-Third Session (23 April–June and 2 July–August 2001): Chapter IV, 2001 Y.B. Int‘l Comm‘n 
20, 112–16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Ass.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter State Responsibility] 
(referencing Articles 40 and 41).  
 3. See, e.g., id. at 112 (―The concept of peremptory norms of general international law is 
recognized in international practice, in the jurisprudence of international and national courts and 
tribunals and in legal doctrine.‖). 
 4. See, e.g., Anthony D‘Amato, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT‘L L. 1 
(1990); Dinah Shelton, International Law and ―Relative Normativity‖, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 150–
51 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1st ed. 2003) (―The theory of jus cogens or peremptory norms posits that 
there are rules from which no derogation is permitted and which can be amended only by a new 
general norm of international law of the same value. . . . In national legal systems, it is a general 
principle of law that individual freedom of contract is limited by the general interest. Agreements that 
have an illegal objective are void and those against public policy will not be enforced. Private 
agreements, therefore, cannot derogate from public policy of the community. The international 
community remains divided over whether the same rules apply to the international legal system.‖) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss1/2
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Peremptory norms are interesting, among other reasons, precisely 
because of their political and/or moral dimension.
5
 Accounting for this 
moral dimension in objective terms poses difficulties that raise tricky 
theoretical questions. Sir Robert Jennings‘s insight succinctly 
acknowledges the difficulty in making moral claims about the 
international community, recognizing that ―[a]n international law which is 
indubitably European and Christian in its historical origins, has suddenly 
to cope with a community of States and peoples in which there is no 
longer a shared cultural tradition.‖6 
This Article will argue that a contractarian approach may aid in the 
process of identifying
7
 which customary norms of international law protect 
 
 
(footnotes omitted). Kelsen, writing in 1962, expressed doubt about the concept. See HANS KELSEN, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 483 (ROBERT W. TUCKER ed., 2d ed. 1966) (―Another question 
arising with respect to the material sphere of validity of treaties is whether by a treaty the application 
of norms of general international law can be excluded; or, as the question is usually formulated, 
whether a treaty at variance with norms of general international law is to be considered as valid. It is 
the question whether the norms of customary general international law have the character of jus cogens 
(‗cogent law‘) or of jus dispositivum (‗yielding law‘). No clear answer to this question can be found in 
the traditional theory of international law. Some writers maintain that there exists complete, or almost 
complete, freedom of contract in this respect; others maintain that treaties which are at variance with 
universally recognized principles of international law are null and void. But they do not and cannot 
precisely designate the norms of general international law which have the character of jus cogens, that 
is to say, the application of which cannot be excluded by a treaty. It is probable that a treaty by which 
two or more states release one another from the obligations imposed upon them by the norm of general 
international law prohibiting occupation of parts of the open sea, would be declared null and void by 
an international tribunal competent to deal with this case. But it can hardly be denied that states may 
by a valid treaty renounce in their mutual relations the right of exercising protection over their own 
citizens, a right conferred upon them by general international law.‖) (footnote omitted). 
 5. All legal norms that are accepted as having peremptory legal consequences, including the 
prohibitions respectively of the use of force, of genocide, of war crimes, of torture, and of racial 
discrimination, as well as the right to popular self-determination, protect fundamental goals and 
interests of the international community. 
 6. Sir Robert Jennings, Universal International Law in a Multicultural World, in LIBER 
AMICORUM FOR THE RT. HON. LORD WILBERFORCE 39, 40 (Maarten Bos & Ian Brownlie eds., 1987). 
See also id. at 44 (―Now, it is a fact of history that the fabric of modern international law was woven 
on the warp of a European tradition and nothing can alter that fact.‖); see generally id. at 40 (―It has to 
be able to comprehend not only different cultures and traditions, but also some that are even more 
ancient, and representative of larger populations than those that belong to the European tradition.‖); 
see generally id. at 44–45 (―Now it is also the case that the post-Second-World-War explosion of new 
nation-States which emerged from former colonial States, or at any rate from dependent States in one 
form or another, is in a significant sense a continuation and perhaps even a completion of that 
evolution of the nation-State world, which required and produced the original European international 
law. . . . The former colonial territories wanted to be as their masters had been. . . . Thus, it was, it is 
submitted, inescapable that the newly enlarged society of States should begin with the common stock 
of traditional international law, for historical and sociological reasons as well as reasons of legal 
principle.‖). 
 7. The Vienna Convention offers a widely endorsed procedure for the identification of 
peremptory norms. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53, 1155 UNTS 331, 344 (May 
23, 1969) [hereinafter VCLT]. The International Law Commission deemed it wisest not to specify 
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principles and policies that are of fundamental importance to the 
international community in the relevant sense, since it is customary norms 
with this quality that are widely associated with the body of peremptory 
international law. This approach is by no means offered as a full account 
of peremptory norms in international law, but rather in order to understand 
one particular aspect often associated with these norms. 
After a brief doctrinal overview and an introduction to the central 
concepts in the debates surrounding peremptory norms in general 
international law, the paper will make the following claims: (1) Natural 
law theory is ill-suited to explain why the international legal system 
embraced peremptory norms. (2) Political constructivism in the tradition 
of John Rawls‘s presentation of social contract theory offers justificatory 
devices capable of supporting the fundamentality of those international 
legal norms that give rise to peremptory legal consequences. (3) Rawls‘s 
own formulation of the appropriate model of representation for 
international justice should be applied with caution, however, because 
Rawls may be asking different questions from the ones we are 
considering. A ―cosmopolitan‖ initial choice situation may offer a more 
appropriate theoretical approach to understanding what we mean when we 
say that a legal norm protects a political or moral principle or policy that is 
fundamental to the international community. 
One of the more sobering lessons of the twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries is that value pluralism simply is a fact of life, a fortiori on a 
global scale. International political culture and the developments in 
international law since World War II have at times sought to portray 
humanity, as a community, unified in moral aims and equipped with a set 
of shared goals and projects. The question then becomes how to account 
for these supposedly universal concerns, bearing in mind that the 
―European‖ tradition in international law has been called into question by 
states that have emerged from the grip of former colonial masters. 
Under certain conceptions of peremptory norms, such as that embodied 
in Article 53 VCLT, we look to states‘ acceptance and recognition of a 
legal norm‘s non-derogability as markers of whether the legal norm in 
 
 
examples of peremptory norms, but rather to leave their identification to be worked out gradually. See 
Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, 1966 Y.B. Int‘l L. Comm‘n 169, 249, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 (―The emergence of rules having the character of jus cogens is 
comparatively recent, while international law is in process of rapid development. The Commission 
considered the right course to be to provide in general terms that a treaty is void if it conflicts with a 
rule of jus cogens and to leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals.‖) (referencing the commentary on the Draft Articles in the 
Law of Treaties) [hereinafter Reports of the Commission]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss1/2
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question gives rise to peremptory legal consequences.
8
 In addition to state 
practice and opinio juris supporting a given norm‘s legal character, it must 
moreover support its peremptory character.
9
 
The policy underlying a norm‘s peremptory character is often 
associated with the importance to the international community of the 
value(s) the legal norm seeks to safeguard. The practice of international 
courts and tribunals points to value considerations in association with the 
identification of peremptory norms. Consider merely two examples. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. 
Anto Furundžija noted, rhetorically, that it was states‘ ―revulsion‖ against 
torture that had 
led to the cluster of treaty and customary rules on torture acquiring 
a particularly high status in the international normative system, a 
status similar to that of principles such as those prohibiting 
genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, aggression, the acquisition 
of territory by force and the forcible suppression of the right of 
peoples to self-determination.
10
 
The tribunal in an important passage further noted: ―[b]ecause of the 
importance of the values it protects, this principle has evolved into a 
peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in 
the international hierarchy than treaty law and even ‗ordinary‘ customary 
rules.‖11 As a second example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
in its Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants 
 
 
 8. VCLT, Article 53, supra note 7 (―A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.‖). 
 9. That means primarily its non-derogability and its immunity from change, save through a 
subsequent norm equal status. These are the characteristics of peremptory norms that are codified in 
Article 53 VCLT. See, e.g., Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 373 (6th Cir. 2001), for an application of 
this two-step reasoning:  
There is no indication that the countries that have abolished the death penalty have done so 
out of a sense of legal obligation, rather than for moral, political, or other reasons. Moreover, 
since the abolition of the death penalty is not a customary norm of international law, it cannot 
have risen to the level that the international community as a whole recognizes it as jus cogens, 
or a norm from which no derogation is permitted. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the 
abolition of the death penalty is a customary norm of international law or that it has risen to 
the higher status of jus cogens. 
Id. 
 10. Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Judgment, ¶ 147 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
 11. Id. ¶ 153. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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advisory opinion noted: ―this Court considers that the principle of equality 
before the law, equal protection before the law and non-discrimination 
belongs to jus cogens, because the whole legal structure of national and 
international public order rests on it and it is a fundamental principle that 
permeates all laws.‖12 
But can we ever reach agreement on the essentials of the political 
morality of the international legal system, should this indeed be a 
necessary step in identifying peremptory norms? There is strong empirical 
evidence to the contrary, and we may even question to what extent a 
normative international community exists.
13
 To provide an account of a 
legal norm‘s fundamental importance to the community of states, we will 
consider a model of representation that situates parties equally and fairly 
in the Rawlsian sense
14
 and that arbitrates between competing conceptions 
about which rules and principles are fundamental in the relevant sense. 
The outcomes of such a model can be deemed universally acceptable to 
the extent they are adopted from an impartial point of view. By extending 
modern social contract theory to the global level we can eventually arrive 
at a political conception of the meaning of a principle‘s or policy‘s 
fundamental character that fits our considered judgments about the values, 
if any, that international law embodies today. Our task is to provide a 
theoretical, yet plausible, approach to the supposedly fundamental 
importance to the international community of states of norms with 
peremptory legal consequences, in a world of competing value 
preferences. The discussion will presuppose familiarity with some of the 
concepts in the work of John Rawls and, in particular, The Law of Peoples 
since this will serve as the main starting point for the discussion. Also, the 
discussion of the fundamental importance of principles and rules 
 
 
 12. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 101 (Sept. 17, 1983). 
 13. See, e.g., David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT‘L L. 85 (2004) 
(writing in the context of crimes against humanity, the prohibition of which is widely considered 
peremptory under international law). Luban notes that  
only political communities can promulgate laws, and humanity does not form a political 
community. There is no world government (a good thing, too), nor do relationships exist 
among humanity as a whole that qualify it as a single people. Human groups are diverse, and 
diversity as such yields no basis for political community. 
 Id. at 126. Despite Luban‘s assertions, there are developments that are driving the diverse peoples of 
the worlds into closer political association, certainly to a greater extent than has been the case in 
previous history. Also, the suggestion that diversity forms no basis for political community is 
misleading. Certainly it is not true that political community is not possible in the face of diversity, for 
many domestic societies, especially the United States, are highly diverse. The empirical evidence 
indicates that homogeneity is not a necessary condition for political community. 
 14. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 32 (1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, PEOPLES]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND PEREMPTORY NORMS 7 
 
 
 
 
associated with peremptory legal consequences is deliberately more 
abstract than the treatment this question tends to receive in much of the 
existing literature. However, some of the questions that peremptory norms 
raise call precisely for abstract theoretical discussion. 
The so-called ―content‖ of the body of peremptory international law—
that is, the catalogue of customary norms that are identified as having 
peremptory character—raises probing questions, such as whether these 
legal norms are peremptory in part because of their fundamental 
importance to the international community. If we assume this to be the 
position, then the international legal order embodies specific substantive 
goals. We might, for instance, claim that the aim of international law lies 
in the promotion of peaceful relations and of human rights, though we 
have to advance independent arguments to support this suggestion. Further 
questions with respect to legal consequences arise where a government 
offends a peremptory norm that protects fundamental human rights—take 
for instance the stark example of the prohibition against genocide
15—on its 
own territory and in its purely domestic affairs.
16
 
I. SOME REMARKS ON THE NATURE OF PEREMPTORY NORMS 
A. Character and Legal Consequences of Peremptory Norms 
Norms belonging to the jus cogens are rules of customary international 
law
17
 that give rise to a particular range of legal consequences.
18
 Their 
peremptory character deprives inconsistent transactions between states of 
legal validity, and, in the case of the use of force, usually deprives 
unilateral state action of legality. ―Peremptory‖ describes not the nature of 
a legal norm or its source of legal validity, but rather the particular legal 
consequences it gives rise to. 
 
 
 15. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. 
Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application, 2006 I.C.J. 6, 30–
31 (Feb. 3); see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bos. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. and Mont.)), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 7 (Feb. 3). 
 16. The facts surrounding the breach of a peremptory norm may also bring into operation 
international criminal law. 
 17. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD), THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES, § 102 reporter‘s note 6: ―[The concept of jus cogens] is now widely accepted, however, as a 
principle of customary law (albeit of higher status).‖ On the Restatement‘s position on the content of 
this sub-set, see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD), THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES, §702(n) (1987). See generally State Responsibility supra note 2, at 85. 
 18. Article 53 VCLT equates a norm‘s non-derogability with its peremptory character for the 
purposes of that instrument. VCLT, Article 53, supra note 7. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Peremptory norms are usually conceived of as constituting part of the 
body of customary law applying to all states commonly referred to as 
―general international law.‖19 Indeed, it would seem that only if a norm is 
of general application to all states can it be of sufficient weight to become 
accepted as a peremptory norm of international law. Kolb, in his treatment 
of the jus cogens, suggests that peremptory norms are not necessarily part 
of general international law, but rather that peremptory norms can likewise 
exist at the regional level.
20
 However, the majority view is that peremptory 
norms are part of general international law. Custom, on the contrary, is not 
always general. States can on some views resist the binding force of 
customary rules of international law by persistently objecting during a 
customary rule‘s period of formation.21 Also, international law probably 
acknowledges the possibility of regional
22
 and even of local
23
 customary 
law, the latter perhaps even between as few as two states.
24
 
What follows is not an exhaustive exegesis of jus cogens in legal and 
academic opinion. The discussion‘s aim is to discern some of the criteria 
for an international legal norm‘s peremptory character. The discussion will 
also consider the relationship between a legal norm‘s fundamental 
importance to the community of states and its peremptory character.
25
 This 
 
 
 19. Weil is critical of the use of this term. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in 
International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT‘L L. 413, 436–37 (1983). 
 20. ROBERT KOLB, THEORIE DU IUS COGENS INTERNATIONAL: ESSAI DE RELECTURE DU CONCEPT 
139, 177, 189 (2001). 
 21. According to the persistent objector doctrine, a state that through its practice consistently 
objects to an emerging rule of customary international law during that rule‘s period of formation will 
not be considered bound by that rule. For an articulation of the persistent objector doctrine by the ICJ, 
see Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131. See also Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 
Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277–78 (Nov. 20). Some scholars are skeptical about the persistent objector 
doctrine. See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT‘L L. 529, 538–42 
(1993). 
 22. See Asylum, 1950 I.C.J. at 276–77 (for suggestion to the effect that regional custom is in 
principle possible). 
 23. See Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Judgment, 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr.12). 
 24. Id. at 39 (―It is difficult to see why the number of States between which a local custom may 
be established on the basis of long practice must necessarily be larger than two.‖). 
 25. See ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 106 
(2006) (―[It] is broadly accepted that jus cogens reflecting community values should bind all States 
without exception notwithstanding their possible dissent.‖). See also id. at 108–09 (―Traditional 
sources of international law such as treaty and custom are generally regarded as the product of the 
consent of States. This could work against the conclusion that those sources give rise to peremptory 
norms. The conceptual difficulty thus arising is how consensual sources can give rise to norms that 
apply to States despite their consent and are concerned with the a priori hierarchy of norms which can 
operate despite and above the will of States expressed in traditional sources of law. These concerns 
could entail a logical necessity to consider that peremptory norms are not subsumable under traditional 
sources but can only be based on a specific source of international law which covers only those norms 
which the international community considers so fundamental that it endows them with the superior 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss1/2
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is an important aspect. The International Law Commission in 1966 for 
instance noted that ―[i]t is not the form of a general rule of international 
law but the particular nature of the subject-matter with which it deals that 
may, in the opinion of the Commission, give it the character of jus 
cogens.‖26 
The development of peremptory norms took its most concrete shape 
with the codification of this concept in the 1969 Vienna Convention of the 
Law of Treaties (―VCLT‖). Yet it is the International Law Commission‘s 
preparatory work that is perhaps of equal interest for tracing the 
development of this legal concept. The International Law Commission, in 
its 1966 commentary to the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, noted 
with respect to Article 50 of the Draft Articles, which would become 
Article 53 VCLT: 
The view that in the last analysis there is no rule of international law 
from which States cannot at their own free will contract out has 
become increasingly difficult to sustain. . . . [I]f some Governments 
in their comments have expressed doubts as to the advisability of 
this article . . .[,] only one questioned the existence of rules of jus 
cogens in the international law of to-day.
27
 
Norms of jus cogens are widely regarded as giving rise to obligations erga 
omnes,
28
 that is, obligations owed not bilaterally to one or more particular 
state or states, but to the community of states as a whole. However, the 
International Court of Justice (―ICJ‖) in Armed Activities (New 
Application: 2002) deemed this erga omnes character alone insufficient to 
confer jurisdiction on the Court to hear cases arising out of the breach of a 
jus cogens norm.
29
 The Court‘s jurisdiction remains firmly consensual. 
 
 
peremptory status. . . . Therefore, it may be suggested that jus cogens is based on an autonomous body 
of superior rules, independent of any source of international law. This suggestion is intended not to 
provoke a discussion on the relationship between natural and positive law, but to emphasize the special 
character of peremptory norms. Also, the affirmation that peremptory norms can be created through 
the autonomous source does not necessarily operate to the exclusion of the relevance of other sources 
in the same process. It is only meant to address the question of possible lack of relevance of the 
traditional sources of law in giving rise to peremptory norms, and suggest the viable alternatives of 
comprehending the international public order in the context of the process of international law-
making.‖). 
 26. Reports of the Commission, supra note 7, at 248. 
 27. Id. at 247. 
 28. While the notions of peremptory norms and obligations erga omnes are related, there is still 
some disagreement about the nature of the relationship. 
 29. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002), 2006 I.C.J. at 52 
(―Finally, the Court deems it necessary to recall that the mere fact that rights and obligations erga 
omnes or peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) are at issue in a dispute cannot in 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The widely accepted catalogue of peremptory norms notably includes 
customary rules of international law that protect against grave human 
rights abuses. Indeed, the concept of norms giving rise to peremptory legal 
consequences emerged parallel to the development of customary 
international human rights law and international criminal law. The 
catalogue of peremptory norms has obvious moral overtones.
30
 
Orakhelashvili underlines the formal and substantive dimensions of 
peremptory norms: 
The identification of the peremptory character of a norm requires a 
multi-level analysis: the categorical argument focuses on the basic 
nature of peremptory norms, on factors that make a norm 
peremptory; the normative argument examines whether a norm 
categorically qualifying as part of jus cogens is so recognized under 
international law. . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . There is strong doctrinal support for the idea that jus cogens has 
its roots in the natural law doctrine of classical international law, or 
embodies natural law propositions applicable to all legal systems.
31
 
Not all scholars would go this far, yet the idea that a legal norm‘s 
fundamental importance to the international community is associated with 
its peremptory character is likewise reflected in many judicial dicta on 
peremptory norms in international courts and tribunals.
32
 In the thicket of 
 
 
itself constitute an exception to the principle that its jurisdiction always depends on the consent of the 
parties.‖). In the context of state immunity in claims alleging the breach of one or more peremptory 
norm(s) it will be interesting to follow the developments in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
(Germany v. Italy), currently before the International Court of Justice. 
 30. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 25, at 48–49 (―Although the starting-point distinction can 
be made between the mere concept of morality and peremptory norms mentioned in Article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention as legal norms, the crucial question is the relevance of the morality factor in 
conferring the peremptory character to legal norms. . . . Morality can arguably itself explain a norm‘s 
peremptory character.‖) (footnote omitted). 
 31. Id. at 36 (footnote omitted). The author further notes:  
The concept of jus cogens requires re-examination of the positivist approach, and this is 
likewise affirmed by those who oppose the concept of international public order. Verdross 
observed that the existence of jus cogens was not doubted before the positivist doctrinal 
takeover. Arguably, ―the conception of jus cogens will remain incomplete as long as it is not 
based on philosophy of values like natural law‖ as jus cogens grew out of the naturalist 
school. Alternatively, jus cogens is not natural law but the expression of common legal order 
within the community of nations reflecting their historically created common conviction. 
Id. at 37–38 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Bruno Simma, The Contribution of Alfred Verdross to the 
Theory of International Law, 6 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 33, 51–54 (1995)). 
 32. See above discussions of ICTY and Inter-American Court dicta. 
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disagreement about the nature of peremptory legal consequences in 
international law, there is at least agreement on the proposition that all 
international legal norms accepted as giving rise to such consequences 
enjoy a significant moral imprimatur. Furthermore, some courts and 
scholars suggest that it is at least in part because of these moral credentials 
that a norm gives rise to peremptory legal consequences. This idea of 
fundamental importance is habitually invoked in the human rights context, 
notably in contemporary debates surrounding the question whether the 
customary norm imposing a legal obligation on governments to refrain 
from acts of torture gives rise to peremptory legal consequences.
33
 The 
normative argument underpinning substantive human rights norms‘ 
peremptory character lies at the crossroads between legal doctrine and 
political philosophy, and raises theoretical questions: 
Rather close to natural law is the notion of jus cogens, compelling 
law. Jus cogens is a norm thought to be so fundamental that it 
invalidates rules consented to by states in treaties or custom. 
Needless to say, the very possibility of such a fundamental law is 
hotly controverted by positivists who rely exclusively on state 
consent for the making of international law. Jus cogens postulates 
an international public order potent enough to invalidate some 
norms that particular states might otherwise establish for 
themselves.
34
 
It may however be misleading to cast the debate over peremptory norms as 
one that opposes natural law theorists and legal positivists. In the end, we 
can explain the range of peremptory legal consequences satisfactorily 
without appealing to broader theories about the nature of law. The 
interesting theoretical questions that do however arise in this context are 
why the international legal system embraced the concept of peremptory 
norms in the first place and why it did so around the time following World 
War II, and moreover why these particular legal consequences almost 
invariably attach to customary norms of international law that are 
fundamental in some sense because they safeguard basic human rights or 
international peace and security. Peremptory legal consequences originally 
only extended to treaties. A treaty that conflicts with a peremptory norm is 
 
 
 33. See, e.g., Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 32 Eur.Ct. H.R. 11 (2002) (discussing the 
crystallization of this norm). 
 34. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1988). 
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void ab initio as a matter of international law.
35
 This legal consequence is 
codified in Article 53 VCLT
36
 and, according to the International Law 
Commission‘s preparatory work, entails an obligation for treaty-parties of 
non-compliance with the offending provision(s) of the relevant treaty.
37
 
The 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations (not 
yet in force) likewise codifies peremptory norms by incorporating, 
verbatim, Article 53 VCLT.
38
 The relatively large number of parties to the 
1969 VCLT (111 parties
39
) provides some evidence of endorsement by 
states
40
 of the concept of jus cogens, and perhaps also for the formal mode 
of identification that Article 53 spells out.
41
 However the VCLT remains a 
treaty and cannot bind non-parties. Moreover, the VCLT only governs the 
law of treaties, and it would be a mistake in any event to read Articles 53 
and 64 as exhaustive statements on peremptory norms and their legal 
consequences in international law.  
 
 
 35. Article 53 of the VCLT textually requires invalidation of the offending treaty in its entirety, 
if it offends a peremptory norm at the moment it is concluded, and this approach is supported by the 
official commentary. See Reports to the Commission, supra note 7, at 248. However, as the 
commentary to the ILC‘s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
indicates:  
The processes of interpretation and application should resolve such questions without any 
need to resort to the secondary rules of State responsibility. In theory, one might envisage a 
conflict arising on a subsequent occasion between a treaty obligation, apparently lawful on its 
face and innocent in its purpose, and a peremptory norm. If such a case were to arise it would 
be too much to invalidate the treaty as a whole merely because its application in the given 
case was not foreseen. But in practice such situations seem not to have occurred. Even if they 
were to arise, peremptory norms of general international law generate strong interpretative 
principles which will resolve all or most apparent conflicts. 
State Responsibility, supra note 2, at 85 (footnote omitted). There appears to be ambiguity on this 
point; however it also does not seem to be of significant practical import. 
 36. VCLT, Article 53, supra note 7. 
 37. Law of Treaties, Fourth report by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, 1959 Y.B. 
Int‘l Comm‘n 37, 46, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1959.ADD.1, YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW COMMISSION, VOLUME II 37, 46 (1959). 
 38. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or 
between International Organizations, Article 53 (1986, not yet in force), Doc.A/CONF.129/15. 
 39. See Law of Treaties (Nov. 9, 2011), http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src= 
UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (listing the membership 
to the VCLT as of Nov. 9, 2011). 
 40. With the notable exception of the objections by France to the codification of the jus cogens 
concept at the 1969 Vienna Treaty Conference, and its vote against the Convention text. See generally 
Olivier Deleau, Les positions françaises à la conférence de Vienne sur le droit des traités [France’s 
Positions at the Vienna Treaty Conference], ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 7, 14–17 
(1969). 
 41. VCLT, Article 64, supra note 7, at 347 (―If a new peremptory norm of general international 
law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.‖). 
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The jus cogens as a body of peremptory international law is sometimes 
associated with the idea of ―ordre public,‖ which, while originally a term 
of art, can be translated as ―public order‖ or ―public policy.‖ In 
international law, ―[p]ublic order is meant as a restriction upon acts which 
are thought to be harmful to the community.‖42 In domestic legal systems, 
the term describes the body of law that parties cannot contract out of by 
private agreement because of the public interest.  
Peremptory legal consequences extend beyond treaties because they 
extend to all other transactions, such as the formation of custom, and to 
unilateral action, such as the use of force or certain human rights 
violations: ―various tribunals, national and international, have affirmed the 
idea of peremptory norms in contexts not limited to the validity of 
treaties.‖43 Moreover, a state‘s serious breach of a peremptory norm of 
general international law gives rise to an obligations on the part of other 
states not to recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of a 
peremptory norm, nor to offer aid or assistance in maintaining that 
situation, as well as a collective obligation to bring the situation to a 
lawful end. This is the position in Article 41 of the ILC‘s Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
44
  
In the 2006 Armed Activities judgment the ICJ for the first time openly 
espoused the concept of jus cogens and acknowledged the prohibition of 
genocide as a particular peremptory norm (thereby lending substance to 
the concept).
45
 Thus Armed Activities in a sense did for peremptory norms 
what the Barcelona Traction judgment did for obligations erga omnes in 
international law.
46
 Moreover, the Court confirmed the prohibition of 
genocide in international law as a peremptory norm in 2007 in Application 
 
 
 42. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 25, at 46 (footnote omitted). 
 43. State Responsibility, supra note 2, at 85. 
 44. The Articles are generally viewed as an authoritative statement on the law of state 
responsibility. 
 45. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002), 2006 I.C.J. at 32. 
 46. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain) (New Application: 
1962, Second Phase), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5). However, the introduction of the term 
obligations erga omnes in this 1970 judgment generated confusion, not least because the VCLT had in 
1969 codified the notion of peremptory norms. The Court was probably reluctant to use the term 
―peremptory norms,‖ because it did not wish to create an embarrassment for states opposed to the 
notion. 
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of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide:
47
  
The Court reaffirmed the 1951 and 1996 statements in its Judgment 
of 3 February 2006 in the case concerning Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (New Application 2002) (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), paragraph 64, when it added 
that the norm prohibiting genocide was assuredly a peremptory 
norm of international law (jus cogens).
48
  
These are the ICJ‘s most straightforward acknowledgments of the concept 
of peremptory norms in international law. 
Earlier ICJ references to peremptory norms had been tentative. The 
ICJ‘s judgment in Military and Paramilitary Activities in 1986 was the 
time the Court explicitly considered the concept of peremptory norms.
49
 
The Court cited the International Law Commission‘s commentary to 
Article 50 of the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties of 1966 and the 
memorial on the merits and the counter-memorial on the question of 
jurisdiction and admissibility of Nicaragua and of the United States, 
respectively, to the effect that the prohibition of the use of force in 
international law possibly had peremptory character.
50
 The Court 
previously showed unwillingness to address any questions with respect to 
the jus cogens in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, although it 
did mention the concept by name.
51
 
The VCLT mode of identification, which grounds a legal norm‘s 
peremptory character in states‘ acceptance and recognition of its non-
derogability, textually requires unanimity among states, that is, the legal 
norm in question must be ―accepted and recognized by the international 
 
 
 47. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
2007 I.C.J. at 111. 
 48. Id. at 61. 
 49. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment on 
the Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100 (June 27) (―A further confirmation of the validity as customary 
international law of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations may be found in the fact that it is frequently referred 
to in statements by State representatives as being not only a principle of customary international law 
but also a fundamental or cardinal principle of such law. The International Law Commission, in the 
course of its work on the codification of the law of treaties, expressed the view that ‗the law of the 
Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a 
rule in international law having the character of jus cogens.‘‖). 
 50. The Court did not however take a definite position on the question whether the prohibition of 
the use of force qualified as a peremptory norm. 
 51. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1967 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 
20). 
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community of States as a whole‖52 as one from which no derogation is 
permitted. However, one view suggests that strict unanimity is not 
required, since otherwise all states would effectively wield an unfair veto 
power.
53
 This view, however, on the other hand gives rise to the concern 
that a majority of states could potentially impose a catalogue of 
peremptory norms on an objecting minority of states. 
A doctrinally less rigorous albeit widely used mode of identifying 
international legal norms with peremptory consequences traces a norm‘s 
peremptory status to state acceptance and recognition but also looks to the 
pronouncements of international and possibly national judicial organs as a 
subsidiary means for the identification of these norms. In practice, this 
mode of identification seems to allow judicial bodies, in practice notably 
the ICJ, to play a role in the development of an international legal norm‘s 
peremptory character.
54
 This mode of identification places a premium on 
decisions of courts and tribunals and seems closer to the realities 
surrounding the identification of peremptory norms in practice. However, 
this approach to the identification of peremptory norms does not square 
with the fact that under Article 38 of its Statute, that the ICJ has no 
institutional mandate to create new rules of law, but rather is limited to 
deciding cases in accordance with existing rules of international law.
55
 
Moreover under the approach adopted in Article 38(1)(d) of its Statute, 
judicial decisions and writings of the most highly qualified publicists can 
serve merely as a ―subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law.‖56 Thus, judicial pronouncements and scholarly writings do play a 
role, albeit a limited and merely material one, in the identification of 
peremptory norms within the Article 38 regime. A fortiori, the decisions of 
regional human rights courts (such as the Inter-American Court of Human 
 
 
 52. VCLT, Article 53. 
 53. See State Responsibility, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Twenty-Eighth Session, 1976 Y.B. Int‘l L. Comm‘n 69, 119, A/CN.4/SER.A./1976/Add.1(Part 1) 
(discussing the effective veto in its commentary to the subsequently removed Draft Article 19 on 
―[i]nternational crimes and delicts‖ of the Draft articles on State responsibility, and noting that the 
same reasoning applies to the text of Article 53 VCLT). 
 54. The Armed Activities case is the only ICJ decision which explicitly identifies one particular 
international legal norm, the prohibition of genocide, as a peremptory norm. Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002), 2006 I.C.J. at 32. The suggestion in Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua that the prohibition of the use of force was 
peremptory was far more tentative. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 
1986 I.C.J. at 97. 
 55. Under Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute the Court‘s ―function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it.‖ Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 
38(1), June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
 56. Id. (referring to Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ statute). 
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Rights or the European Court of Human Rights), and even more so of 
domestic courts, only play a limited role in the development of peremptory 
norms, and must therefore be relied on with caution.  
Post-War international political culture initially opened a hopeful 
chapter in international legal developments, which notably saw the birth 
and growth of the United Nations system. International law today is 
experiencing a degree of tension between the institutional mandates of 
certain international organizations and traditional incidents of sovereignty. 
If we follow the VCLT Article 53 procedure for identifying international 
legal norms that give rise to peremptory legal consequences we want to be 
satisfied that the procedure gives prima facie weight to each state‘s 
posture towards the status of the legal norm in question. The United 
Nations General Assembly may be the likeliest deliberative body in which 
states could express their positions. However, this is only one avenue for 
ascertaining states‘ postures, and, in any event, General Assembly 
resolutions by themselves enjoy no legally binding force, although they 
might reflect opinio juris.  
B. Human Rights Norms and Peremptory Character  
The peremptory norms ―clearly accepted and recognized include the 
prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes 
against humanity and torture, and the right to self-determination.‖57 
Beyond this narrow class, however, the body of peremptory international 
law lacks precision. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights for 
instance has suggested that the principle of equality before the law has 
peremptory character,
58
 and the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights has maintained that there exists under international law a 
peremptory human rights principle that prohibits the execution of 
minors.
59
 Moreover, there have been suggestions that there exists under 
customary international law a principle prohibiting gender discrimination 
that meets the conditions in order to be peremptory in its legal 
consequences.
60
 
 
 
 57. State Responsibility, supra note 2, at 85. 
 58. See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, supra note 12. 
 59. Michael Domingues/United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., Report No. 62/02, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc.1, rev. 1 (2002). 
 60. See Guglielmo Verdirame, Testing the Effectiveness of International Norms: The Provision 
of Humanitarian Assistance by the UN and Sexual Apartheid in Afghanistan, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 733, 
762, 765 (2001). 
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How are human rights principles related to the body of peremptory 
international law? Schachter has suggested that all international human 
rights norms should have peremptory legal consequences, but the point 
remains controversial.
61
 It seems, as the concept developed over the 
twentieth century, that an international legal norm‘s fundamental 
importance to the international community might support the conclusion 
that it is peremptory. It is likely that only legal norms that are fundamental 
in this sense would ever become accepted and recognized by the 
community of states as being non-derogable. There may or may not be 
conceptual kinship between political or moral fundamentality and legal 
non-derogability, but there is a close association between these features in 
the way peremptory norms developed in practice. Given developments in 
this area of international law to date, it is indeed difficult to imagine 
anything other than a politically or morally fundamental legal norm 
becoming accepted as one that gives rise to peremptory legal 
consequences.
62
 Recall, for example, the ICTY‘s dictum in Prosecutor v. 
Furundžija noted above.63 Even if there is no sufficient or even necessary 
connection in international law between peremptoriness and human rights 
considerations, dicta such as this and the abovementioned catalogue of 
widely accepted peremptory norms show that there is at least a close 
association in legal practice between peremptory norms and human rights. 
 
 
 61. See, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 342 (1991) 
(discussing the possibility of human rights as jus cogens). See also ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 25, 
at 55–56 (―[T]he doctrinal treatment of the subject reveals the need to have independent criteria for 
identifying peremptory human rights, especially in terms of the doctrinal debate as to whether all 
human rights are peremptory or only some of them possess such status. . . . There is a doctrinal view 
that peremptory norms cover all human rights . . . .‖). 
 62. Quaere, for instance, whether environmental norms could realistically become peremptory 
norms; certainly they could be of fundamental interest to the international community, yet we would 
not characterize environmental norms as human rights norms. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 25, at 
65 (discussing the current lack of peremptory character of any international environmental norms, 
including the principle of harm prevention). The responsiveness of peremptory norms to the moral 
imperatives of the moment can also cut the other way:  
There is nothing in [the] effects of jus cogens to require for their viability the existence of 
some centralized government or authority that would be authorized to create and administer 
international law. If, on the other hand, the accepted structure of international law means the 
paramount validity of certain principles and institutions in the scope and shape in which they 
exist at the certain fixed period of time or stage of development, it is beyond doubt that most 
if not all legal institutions are subject to change and modification in terms of what the 
prevailing community needs may require. Consequently, certain principles that were at some 
stage considered as fundamental to the character of international law need not be so 
considered forever. 
 Id. at 79. 
 63. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T ¶ 153. 
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C. The Reception of Peremptory Norms in the Federal Courts 
The Federal Courts have repeatedly discussed the concept of 
peremptory norms, notably in the context of Alien Tort Claims Act 
litigation. Two of the most widely-cited cases containing dicta on the 
nature of peremptory norms are Siderman de Blake v. Republic of 
Argentina
64
 and Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan 
(―CUSCLIN‖).65 The Ninth Circuit in Siderman de Blake noted: 
Whereas customary international law derives solely from the 
consent of states, the fundamental and universal norms constituting 
jus cogens transcend such consent, as exemplified by the theories 
underlying the judgments of the Nuremberg tribunals following 
World War II. . . . Indeed, the supremacy of jus cogens extends over 
all rules of international law.
66
 
The Ninth Circuit‘s bold dictum suggests that a legal norm‘s 
fundamentality and universality are necessarily part of its peremptory legal 
character. Further, the dictum suggests that this peremptory character is 
independent of a state‘s consent or non-consent. If peremptory norms did 
indeed dispense with the requirement of consent to such an extent,
67
 we 
would have to reappraise the consensual nature of international law.
68
 
However, the Ninth Circuit in Siderman de Blake may well have gone too 
far in its assessment of the nature of peremptory norms. 
The D.C. Circuit in CUSCLIN
69
 likewise made relatively bold 
suggestions when discussing peremptory legal consequences associated 
with, and states‘ obligations arising under, peremptory norms of general 
international law. According to the D.C. Circuit, peremptory norms 
may well restrain our government in the same way that the 
Constitution restrains it. If Congress adopted a foreign policy that 
resulted in the enslavement of our citizens or of other individuals, 
that policy might well be subject to challenge in domestic court 
 
 
 64. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 65. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  
 66. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 715–16. 
 67. At the least peremptory international law would restrict states‘ freedom to derogate from 
these peremptory norms in their various transactions. 
 68. This issue raises many questions about sovereignty that we cannot even attempt to answer 
here; suffice it to highlight that we will likely be driven to espouse a more nuanced understanding of 
sovereignty in light of peremptory norms‘ compelling legal consequences under international law. 
 69. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar., 859 F.2d 929. 
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under international law. Such a conclusion was indeed implicit in 
the landmark decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala [sic].
70
 
The Court also noted that if ―Congress and the President violate a 
peremptory norm (or jus cogens), the domestic legal consequences are 
unclear. We need not resolve this uncertainty.‖71 
The Court in Siderman de Blake regards norms with peremptory legal 
consequences as normatively superior to other international legal rules.
72
 It 
is in the sense that peremptory norms rule out the possibility of any 
conflicting norm possessing legal validity that they are ―superior‖ rules of 
law. However the range of peremptory legal consequences remains 
uncertain, according to the D.C. Circuit in CUSCLIN,
73
 although the Court 
does not rule out the possibility that peremptory norms may have certain 
domestic effects. 
D. The Compellingness of the Principles and Policies Protected by 
Peremptory Norms  
Ascertaining which international legal norms are fundamental—
assuming that this is a relevant question to ask in this context—raises 
questions of objectivity. Kadelbach, for instance, includes peremptory 
norms in the category of fundamental norms in international law. 
Fundamental norms are distinct by virtue of their legal consequences.
74
 He 
notes that the criteria for identifying peremptory norms remain somewhat 
unclear, but that fundamental norms in international law are identified 
inductively ―by referring to concrete, intuitively convincing candidate 
rules of primary law.‖75 Such an approach, while appealing, still leaves 
open exactly on what basis states and courts identify those intuitively 
convincing primary norms. Like all rules of customary international law, 
those particular rules that give rise to peremptory legal consequences are 
 
 
 70. Id. at 941. Notably, Filartiga does not mention ―peremptory norms‖ or ―jus cogens.‖ See 
generally Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980). 
 71. Id. at 935. 
 72. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 715–16. 
 73. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar., 859 F.2d at 935–36. 
 74. Stefan Kadelbach, Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and other Rules—The Identification 
of Fundamental Norms, in THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 40 
(Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006). See also STEFAN KADELBACH, 
ZWINGENDES VÖLKERRECHT [COMPELLING INTERNATIONAL LAW] 133 (1992). 
 75. Kadelbach, Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga Omnes and other Rules—The Identification of 
Fundamental Norms, supra note 74, at 28, 40. 
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not enacted in any meaningful way. Their peremptory nature arises 
gradually over time through the practice and legal attitudes of states.
76
 
II. ORIGINAL CONCEPTIONS OF PEREMPTORY NORMS:  
NATURAL LAW ARGUMENTS 
Conceptions of international law that drew on natural right and justice 
slowly yielded to the broadly positivist conception, still dominant in many 
ways, that regards the social facts of state behavior as the norm-creating 
source of international legal obligation.
77
 Verdross, an early champion of 
the notion of the jus cogens,
78
 saw a system of international law as a 
practical necessity and as a creation of practical moral reasoning, writing 
in 1937 that ―every juridical order regulates the rational and moral 
coexistence of the members of a community. No juridical order can, 
therefore, admit treaties between juridical subjects, which are obviously in 
contradiction to the ethics of a certain community.‖79 He notes the role of 
an ethical minimum presupposed by processes of international legal norm-
creation.
80
 He notes that the law of treaties presupposes principles that are 
themselves not formulated by the positive international law, and that 
among these was ―the principle that every treaty presupposes free consent 
on a lawful object, and therefore may never contain provisions contrary to 
good morals.‖81 
 
 
 76. Probably only fundamental legal norms can be considered non-derogable in the relevant 
sense. To forgo some difficulties associated with the identification of fundamental norms, the 1998 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, for example, codifies some of those fundamental 
norms for the purposes of individual criminal responsibility under that Court‘s jurisdiction. Within the 
Court‘s jurisdiction are the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of 
aggression. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
The Statute contains lengthy provisions on the elements of the first three of these crimes in Articles 6, 
7 and 8. Id. art. 6, art. 7, art. 8. 
 77. See, e.g., JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 12–13 (1954) 
(―The positivist preoccupation with treaties and other evidence of State practice, and the Vattelian 
preoccupation with each State‘s fundamental rights, both pointed to the consent of States as the source 
of international legal obligations.‖). 
 78. See Alfred von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. J. INT‘L L. 571 
(1937). 
 79. Id. at 572. See further works by the same author: Alfred von Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and 
Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT‘L L. 55, 58 (1966); Alfred von Verdross, Les principes 
généraux du droit dans la jurisprudence internationale [General Principles of Law in International 
Jurisprudence], 62 RECUEIL DES COURS, VOLUME 52 204 (1935). 
 80. Verdross, supra note 78, at 574. 
 81. Alfred von Verdross, Les principes généraux du droit dans la jurisprudence internationale 
[General Principles of Law in International Jurisprudence], supra note 79, at 204 (―le principe que 
chaque convention suppose un consentement libre sur un objet licite, et ne peut donc jamais avoir un 
contenu contraire aux bonnes mœurs.‖). See further Hersch Lauterpacht, Règles générales du droit de 
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The concept of peremptory norms gradually saw increased acceptance 
by states. Moreover, peremptory norms and international criminal law 
developed in parallel. The war crimes tribunals following World War II set 
an important precedent for the development of international criminal 
law.
82
 The best explanation for the progressive development of peremptory 
norms as a legal concept of international law and the concept‘s close 
association with human rights norms is at least in part historical.
83
 The 
idea of a non-derogable body of rules and principles is, however, older. 
Emer de Vattel, who stands at the transition from classical tradition
84
 in 
international law to a more secular understanding of international law, 
defended the notion of a ―compelling‖ body of law from which states 
enjoyed no freedom to depart in their transactions.
85
 
Vattel‘s approach echoes Article 53 VCLT in that provision‘s emphasis 
on the feature non-derogability as equal to a norm‘s peremptory character. 
However, Articles 53 and 64 VCLT describe the possibility of a changing 
―content‖ of the jus cogens that is simply a function of state acceptance 
and recognition. By specifying a procedure for the identification and 
modification of peremptory norms based on state acceptance and 
recognition, the VCLT envisions peremptory norms as a concept with an 
evolving ―content,‖ which changes as a function of developments in 
international legal practice. It does not associate peremptory norms with a 
fixed set of natural law propositions. 
For much of the history of political thought through the Middle Ages, 
for instance, the prevailing view was that if the sovereignty of the ruler 
was limited, it was limited by virtue of the natural law: ―The Medieval 
notion of Sovereignty, it is true, always differed in principle from that 
exalted notion which prevailed in after times. For one thing, there was 
unanimous agreement that the Sovereign Power, though raised above all 
Positive, is limited by Natural Law.‖86 
 
 
la paix [General Rules of the Law of Peace], 62 RECUEIL DES COURS, VOLUME 62 100, 306–08 
(1937). 
 82. See In re Göring and Others, 13 I.L.R. 203 (Int‘l Mil. Trib. 1946). 
 83. The same may be said of the development of individual criminal responsibility under 
international law. 
 84. See Stephen C. Neff, A Short History of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 31, 39 
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1st. ed. 2003). The classical tradition includes writers active roughly between 
1615 and 1800, and notably includes such scholars as Grotius, Wolff and Pufendorf. See also V.D. 
DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25–29 (1997). 
 85. EMER DE VATTEL, DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE APPLIQUES A LA 
CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR 
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND 
SOVEREIGNS], Préliminaires § 9 (James B. Scott ed., 1916). 
 86. OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE 93 (FREDERIC WILLIAM 
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Theorists of international law have at times celebrated the jus cogens as 
a vindication, or at least a re-emergence, of natural law argument in 
international law, especially in response to nineteenth-century positivism 
and twentieth-century militarism. Despite the school‘s ancient roots, 
however, ―[n]atural law is one of the many parts of international law that 
has never received the systematic study that it merits.‖87 There are 
however critical voices. David Luban, for instance, notes with respect to 
the notion of ―laws of mankind,‖ a notion that overlaps and at times is 
indistinguishable in substance from human-rights-protecting customary 
norms with peremptory legal consequences, that it may well stem from 
―an embarrassed reluctance by twentieth-century jurists to invoke natural 
law, or to invoke more old-fashioned phrases like ‗laws of God‘ or even 
the Enlightenment‘s favorite ‗laws of reason.‘‖88 
According to the early conceptions of the jus cogens in the tradition of 
Verdross peremptory norms in international law can be accounted for fully 
only once we invoke natural law premises. No doubt the overwhelming 
moral significance of those legal norms that have become accepted and 
 
 
MAITLAND, trans. 1958). See also THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT C. 350–C.1450 
454–55 (J.H. Burns ed., 1988) (―That these jurists should have accepted such a normative structure 
was only to be expected: it was, after all, a basic presupposition of the juristic tradition and of 
medieval thought about law and society with, as we shall see, the possible and notorious exception of 
the views of Marsilius of Padua. Thus in all juristic works divine law, natural law, and the ius gentium 
provided necessary criteria according to which human positive law could be judged.‖). See also 
Thomas Baldwin, The Territorial State, in JURISPRUDENCE: CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 207, 210–11 (Hyman 
Gross & Ross Harrison eds., 1992) (―It is often said that this conception [of sovereignty] is 
characteristic of post-medieval Europe, of the decline of the Holy Roman Empire and the rejection of 
the juridical claims of the Papacy; and that the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which brought and end to 
the Thirty Years War, is held to be especially significant in this respect. . . . On further inspection, 
however, the situation appears more complex. The basic idea that politico-legal authority is territorial 
is at least medieval. . . . Another respect in which the familiar appeal to the Peace of Westphalia needs 
to be qualified arises from an implication to which it gives rise, namely that the conception of the state 
to be found in the classic texts of early modern political theory should be of an intrinsically territorial 
entity. The trouble in this case arises from the fact that if one turns to the classic texts, one finds little, 
if any, reference to the territorial nature of the state.‖). 
 87. See Neff, supra note 84, at 34. 
 88. See Luban, supra note 13, at 125. The author further notes:  
Offenses against important community norms are domestic crimes tried by the state, the 
domestic community. In the same way, offenses against ―the laws of humanity‖ are 
international crimes and as such, they must be tried by the international community. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . The phrase ―laws of humanity‖. . . comes from the most important precursors to the 
Nuremberg Charter‘s terminology—the so-called ―Martens Clause‖ in the Preambles to the 
1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. The phrase was used as well in a 1919 report to the 
Versailles Treaty drafters proposing to try the Turkish perpetrators of the Armenian genocide 
for ―offenses against the laws of humanity‖. . . .  
Id. at 124–25. Some of these criticisms can also be leveled against the use of the term international 
―public order.‖ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND PEREMPTORY NORMS 23 
 
 
 
 
recognized as giving rise to peremptory legal consequences raises the 
question whether a political or moral criterion is inherent in the concept of 
jus cogens. The prevailing view today is that it is not. But if it is, 
international law today would be ―moralized‖ and not a set of value-
neutral rules governing states‘ co-existence. It would embody substantive 
political and/or moral pursuits. 
In order to retain its legitimacy, the international legal order must, one 
might argue along the above lines, afford a privileged status to politically 
and/or morally significant legal norms by attaching special legal 
consequences to them, in order to afford heightened protection to the ends 
and values they incorporate. For instance, these legal consequences could 
include precisely the invalidity of transactions that conflict with a 
peremptory norm and particular effects in the law of state responsibility in 
the event of a serious breach of one or more such norms. 
By no means can we here do justice to the rich and varied tradition of 
natural law thinking in international law. This Article introduces these 
arguments at this juncture because natural law is sometimes associated 
with jus cogens without much argument or justification.
89
 However, there 
is nothing mysterious about peremptory legal consequences in 
international law in the way that certain appeals to natural law arguments 
might suggest. Rather, natural law thinking primarily provides a way of 
approaching the question why international law embraced the notion of 
peremptory legal consequences in the second half of the twentieth century. 
III. APPROACHING THE FUNDAMENTALITY OF THE PRINCIPLES 
PROTECTED BY PEREMPTORY NORMS THROUGH  
SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
We will now consider one approach to the claim that an international 
legal norm represents a principle that is fundamental to the international 
community, where conflicting values are a fact of political life. 
Liberalism, a term with a variety of meanings, must, if anything, make 
the claim that coercive legal rules should be acceptable to those on whom 
they are imposed. At the global level, the legal compellingness of rules of 
international law stems from states‘ commitment to legal ordering, rather 
than from centralized processes of rule-making that are institutionally 
authoritative. The meaning of liberalism‘s demand gains force against the 
background of value-pluralism among states and societies. In The Law of 
 
 
 89. See, e.g., South West Africa (Second Phase) (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 
1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18); id. at 250 ( Tanaka, J., dissenting). 
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Peoples, Rawls writes with respect to principles of international justice: 
―A (reasonable) Law of Peoples must be acceptable to reasonable peoples 
who are thus diverse; and it must be fair between them and effective in 
shaping the larger schemes of their cooperation. This fact of reasonable 
pluralism limits what is practically possible here and now. . . .‖90 
The social contract enjoys distinguished lineage not only in the 
domestic but also in the international realm, partially owing to the Kantian 
project in Perpetual Peace.
91
 Analytically, the application of the social 
contract method does not differ in its respective domestic and global 
applications. In application the difference turns largely on the choice of 
participants
92
 and on the principles that these participants deliberate and 
articulate in the initial choice situation. These participants may be social 
(peoples) or individual (persons). Ultimately we must set up an initial 
choice situation
93
 with a choice of participants that reflects the best 
 
 
 90. RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 11–12. The law of peoples must not be confused with the 
Roman law notion of jus gentium. Beitz underscores the distinction between the law of peoples and jus 
gentium traditionally understood. See Charles R. Beitz, Rawls’s Law of Peoples, 110 ETHICS 669, 676 
(2000) (―The Law of Peoples is therefore not to be confused with the jus gentium: it is not a body of 
principles universally accepted by states, nor is it intended necessarily to constitute a reasonable basis 
for the cooperation (or for that matter the peaceful coexistence) of all existing states.‖). 
 91. Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf [Towards Perpetual 
Peace], in IMMANUEL KANT, IMMANUEL KANTS WERKE VI, SCHRIFTEN VON 1790–1796 [WORKS OF 
IMMANUEL KANT VI, WRITINGS FROM 1790–1796] 470 (A. BUCHENAU, E. CASSIRER, B. 
KELLERMANN eds., 1973). On Kant‘s contribution to international social contract theory, see David 
Boucher, Uniting What Right Permits with What Interest Prescribes: Rawls’s Law of Peoples in 
Context, in RAWLS‘S LAW OF PEOPLES: A REALISTIC UTOPIA? 19, 28 (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy 
eds., 2006) (―It is the very emphasis upon conscience in the state of nature (including the international 
‗state of nature‘) by natural law and law of nations theorists that convinced Kant that unless such 
informality of conscience was replaced by the formality of international contracts and agreements to 
establish a peaceful federation with explicitly agreed rules, then nations in their relations with each 
other would continue acting according to their own interpretation of international right, and exercise 
their so-called right to war.‖). The turmoil of the twentieth century should not, Rawls believes, 
undermine our hope that Kant‘s vision of a peaceful international federation can realistically be 
achieved. See RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 21 (―The fact of the Holocaust and our now knowing 
that human society admits of this demonic possibility, however, should not affect our hopes as 
expressed by the idea of a realistic utopia and Kant‘s foedus pacificum.‖). 
 92. See, e.g., RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 32–33 (―Though they do know that reasonably 
favorable conditions obtain that make constitutional democracy possible—since they know they 
represent liberal societies—they do not know the extent of their natural resources, or the level of their 
economic development, or other such information. As members of societies well-ordered by liberal 
conceptions of justice, we conjecture that these features model what we would accept as fair—you and 
I, here and now—in specifying the basic terms of cooperation among peoples who, as liberal peoples, 
see themselves as free and equal. This makes the use of the original position at the second level a 
model of representation in exactly the same way as it is at the first.‖). Beitz, however, points out a 
central distinguishing feature. See Beitz, supra note 90, at 675 (―In the domestic case, the object is to 
choose principles of justice for institutions that will include and apply to everyone. In the international 
case, by contrast, the object is not precisely to choose principles for international institutions.‖). 
 93. The idea of an initial choice situation describes a philosophical device that models 
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interpretation of the ―history and usages of international law and 
practice.‖94 The procedure involves constructing a hypothetical bargaining 
position that models basic convictions about the kind of circumstances in 
which it would be fair for basic political principles of justice to be 
adopted. These convictions most likely include the equal position of the 
parties, a requirement of unanimity, and the shielding of a certain amount 
of knowledge of a party‘s position in the world. 
The contractarian method, which itself falls within the broader 
philosophical field of political constructivism, may be particularly useful 
as an approach to understanding the fundamentality to the international 
community of those international legal norms associated with peremptory 
legal consequences in international law. As indicated above, Courts and 
tribunals have when discussing and identifying peremptory norms 
repeatedly stressed the association of peremptory legal consequences with 
legal norms that are of fundamental importance to the international 
community. The contractarian approach offers a way of thinking about and 
scrutinizing the idea of a norm‘s being fundamental to the international 
community in this relevant respect. It does so for the purposes of 
identifying and justifying which principles are of fundamental importance. 
Legal norms that are fundamental in this sense typically would govern the 
most basic aspects of the relationship between states in the international 
community, as well as between states and peoples and states and 
individuals. 
Of course, we could see in those rules accepted as part of the jus 
cogens in international law (prohibitions of genocide, war crimes, torture, 
crimes against humanity, etc.) a comprehensive conception of the good 
that reflects Western biases or traditions. The contractarian task, however, 
is to see whether we can do more than this, that is, whether the principles 
of political morality underlying the accepted catalogue of peremptory 
norms represent principles of international justice which all states or 
peoples can reasonably accept.
95
 
 
 
deliberating participants in conditions that reflect conditions of impartiality. In this situation, 
participants typically formulate and agree upon political principles of justice. 
 94. See RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 41. 
 95. On this point, see also Rawls‘s notion of ―stability for the right reasons.‖ Id. at 45 (―Stability 
for the right reasons describes a situation in which, over the course of time, citizens acquire a sense of 
justice that inclines them not only to accept but to act upon the principles of justice.‖). Rawls‘s law of 
peoples makes no demands of distributive justice among peoples. While this will not be a central 
theme of the present Article and will receive mention only in passing, certain authors have picked up 
on this dimension of Rawls‘s work. See, e.g., Thomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 
PHIL. PUB. AFF. 195 (1994). 
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A. The Rawlsian International Project 
Rawls in The Law of Peoples adapts the original position, the initial 
choice situation underlying his broader theoretical framework, to the ―law 
of nations.‖96 The substance of his ―eight principles‖ of right and justice in 
international conduct,
97
 which peoples‘ representatives deliberate and 
articulate in this ―second,‖ i.e. global, original position,98 to some extent 
overlap in substance with accepted peremptory norms. The second original 
position is an initial choice situation in most relevant respects analogous to 
that which Rawls offers in A Theory of Justice: ―the original position at the 
second level [is] a model of representation in exactly the same way it is at 
the first.‖99 
In Rawls‘s account of the contractarian hypothetical, the thought 
experiment operates to develop his law of peoples ―within political 
liberalism,‖ as an ―extension of a liberal conception of justice for a 
domestic regime to a Society of Peoples,‖100 that is, to the realms of 
international law and relations. The initial choice situation yields 
principles of political morality that arbitrate neutrally between competing 
conceptions of the good. These principles are acceptable to liberal and to 
―decent‖ peoples.101 This law of peoples is reasonable in the sense that 
 
 
 96. The term ―law of nations‖ is hardly in use today, and Rawls‘s use of the term is misleading 
since he does not discuss rules of law but principles of political justice. Previously there was an 
overlap between that term and ―international law.‖ Henry Wheaton‘s 1836 work bore the title 
Elements of International Law. Neff, supra note 84, at 43. Théophile Funck-Brentano and Albert 
Sorel‘s Précis du droit des gens appeared in 1877. Id. at 43–44. In 1894, however, Henry Bonfils 
published his Manuel de droit international public. Id. 
 97. See RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 37. The eight principles are: 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected 
by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than 
self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that 
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  
 98. The ―first‖ original position is domestic and sees parties choosing principles of justice for a 
domestic society. Id. at 30. 
 99. Id. at 33. 
 100. Id. at 9.  
 101. Id. at 63. 
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peoples that affirm it respect the principle of reciprocity. Peoples that are 
not ―well-ordered,‖ that is those that do not satisfy the criteria to be liberal 
or decent people, are, however, not allowed to the bargaining table.
 102
 
Rawls defines regimes that refuse to comply with a reasonable law of 
peoples as outlaw states.
103
 Indeed, in Rawls‘s account liberal and decent 
peoples owe no duty of toleration to outlaw states. According to Rawls, 
―liberal and decent peoples have the right, under the Law of Peoples, not 
to tolerate outlaw states.‖104 It is, of course, a well-rehearsed criticism of 
Rawls that liberal (and also decent) peoples are the rule-setters, and that 
they moreover enforce these rules against societies that refuse to accept 
them. 
The effect of the law of peoples is to limit the sovereign autonomy that 
states have historically enjoyed. Reasonable peoples, he believes, would 
agree to such limitations. Thus, in The Law of Peoples, Rawls recognizes 
that international law has become stricter in the post-World War II age, 
and that an extension of political liberalism to the international realm 
invites us to adopt a sterner posture towards the scope of sovereign 
power.
105
 According to Rawls, ―[t]he powers of sovereignty also grant a 
state a certain autonomy . . . in dealing with its own people. From 
[Rawls‘s] perspective this autonomy is wrong.‖106 A liberal law of peoples 
under Rawls‘s account ―will restrict a state‘s internal sovereignty or 
(political) autonomy, its alleged right to do as it wills with people within 
 
 
 102. Rawls introduces a typology of peoples:  
I propose considering five types of domestic societies. The first is reasonable liberal peoples; 
the second, decent peoples . . . The basic structure of one kind of decent people has what I 
call a ―decent consultation hierarchy,‖ and these peoples I call ―decent hierarchical peoples.‖ 
Other possible kinds of decent peoples I do not try to describe, but simply leave in reserve, 
allowing that there may be other decent peoples whose basic structure does not fit my 
description of a consultation hierarchy, but who are worthy of membership in a Society of 
Peoples. (Liberal peoples and decent peoples I refer to together as ―well-ordered peoples.‖) 
There are, third, outlaw states and, fourth, societies burdened by unfavorable conditions. 
Finally, fifth, we have societies that are benevolent absolutisms: they honor human rights; 
but, because their members are denied a meaningful role in making political decisions, they 
are not well-ordered.  
RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 4 (footnote omitted). The ideal conception of the law of peoples 
only extends to well-ordered peoples, that is, to liberal and decent peoples, and only these peoples are 
allowed to bargain in the second original position. Nonideal theory is the portion of the law of peoples 
that specifies how well-ordered peoples are to behave towards outlaw states or towards burdened 
societies. Id. at 90. 
 103. Id. at 5. 
 104. Id. at 81. He adds that ―[t]his refusal to tolerate those states is a consequence of liberalism 
and decency.‖ Id. 
 105. Id. at 25–27. 
 106. RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 25–26. 
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its own borders.‖107 Peremptory legal consequences in international law 
likewise delineate the range of lawfully available incidents of sovereignty. 
Human rights norms in general but especially those with peremptory 
character restrict the manners in which it is legally permissible for a 
government and its officials to treat its population with impunity. The 
restrictions that human rights place on sovereignty under international law 
are central in Rawls‘s account: 
Since World War II international law has become stricter. It tends to 
limit a state‘s right to wage war to instances of self-defense (also in 
the interests of collective security), and it also tends to restrict a 
state‘s right to internal sovereignty. The role of human rights 
connects most obviously with the latter change as part of the effort 
to provide a suitable definition of, and limits on, a government‘s 
internal sovereignty.
108
 
Rawls provides a list of eight principles of international conduct, ―familiar 
and traditional principles of justice among free and democratic 
peoples.‖109 The Law of Peoples is an extension of political liberalism to 
the relations of peoples or states also in a wider sense, that is, as an effort 
to justify a set of principles governing international conduct that both 
―liberal‖ and ―decent‖ peoples alike can reasonably accept.110 Decent 
peoples, Rawls believes, would accept the second original position as fair, 
and would agree on the same principles in the second original position as 
liberal peoples would.
111
 According to Rawls ―decent‖ peoples have this 
important characteristic: 
Liberal peoples cannot say that decent peoples deny human rights, 
since . . . such peoples recognize and protect these rights; nor can 
 
 
 107. Id. at 26. 
 108. Id. at 27. Human rights play a key normative role in Rawls‘s liberal law of peoples in that 
they ―restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a regime‘s 
internal autonomy.‖ Id. at 79. Similarly peremptory norms limit states‘ sovereign powers under 
international law to derogate from legal norms accepted as peremptory, a power they would otherwise 
hold with respect to other legal norms. See id. at 79 (discussing the role of human rights as affecting 
state autonomy). Rawls admits that not only liberal but also decent peoples and benevolent absolutisms 
possess the right to self-defense: ―any society that is nonaggressive and that honors human rights has 
the right of self-defense. Its level of spiritual life and culture may not be high in our eyes, but it always 
has the right to defend itself against invasion of its territory.‖ Id. at 92. 
 109. RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 37 n.42 (citing J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PEACE (6th ed. 1963) and TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE 
RELATIONS OF STATES (1983)). He mentions in a footnote that Brierly and Nardin offer similar lists. 
 110. See id. at 62–70.  
 111. Id. at 68–70. 
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liberal peoples say that decent peoples deny their members the right 
to be consulted or a substantial political role in making decisions, 
since the basic structure of these societies will be seen to include a 
decent consultation hierarchy or its equivalent.
112
 
Thus decent peoples, while hierarchical and not liberal, still largely offer 
their citizenry human rights protections. They moreover have no 
aggressive aims vis-à-vis other peoples. They are, in Rawls‘s terms, bona 
fide members of the Society of Peoples.
113
 Extending the law of peoples in 
a way so that decent peoples can reasonably accept it leads to a more 
inclusive model of international relations that, to an extent, defers to the 
reality that various forms of government exist. Rawls writes of the 
extension of the law of peoples to decent societies, a move that is still 
within what Rawls calls ―ideal theory‖: ―[t]he second step of ideal theory 
is more difficult: it challenges us to specify a second kind of society—a 
decent, though not liberal society—to be recognized as a bona fide 
member of a politically reasonable Society of Peoples and in this sense 
‗tolerated.‘‖114 Rawls again underlines decent peoples‘ rights-honoring 
characteristics: ―one condition of a decent hierarchical society is that its 
legal system and social order do not violate human rights.‖115 Another 
important condition is that decent peoples, as opposed to what Rawls calls 
―benevolent absolutisms‖ (which also honor human rights), have in place 
what he labels a ―decent consultation hierarchy.‖116 It is Rawls‘s 
contention that liberal and decent peoples would agree on some 
interpretation of the eight principles, which would include limitations 
upon their sovereign autonomy grounded in human rights concerns: 
―parties representing decent hierarchical societies adopt the same Law of 
Peoples that the parties representing liberal societies adopt.‖117 One of 
Rawls‘s premises is the ―fact of liberal democratic peace,‖ that is, the idea 
that well-ordered peoples, both liberal and decent, in principle do not 
initiate war against other well-ordered peoples.
118
 
 
 
 112. Id. at 61. Rawls spells out the criteria of decency in a people. See also id. at 64–67. 
 113. Id. at 61, 63. 
 114. Id. at 63. 
 115. RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 75. 
 116. Id. at 4. 
 117. Id. at 64. 
 118. Id. at 51–54. See also id. at 90–91 (―Well-ordered peoples, both liberal and decent, do not 
initiate war against one another; they go to war only when they sincerely and reasonably believe that 
their safety and security are seriously endangered by the expansionist policies of outlaw states.‖). This 
claim relies on empirical research about the war-proneness of democratic states towards one another 
(however, democratic states do use military force against non-democratic states). But see Michael W. 
Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205 (1983). 
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Granted the plausibility of the Rawlsian endeavor, it seems possible for 
us to draw on this liberal, political—as opposed to comprehensively 
moral—and ultimately constructivist conception of fundamental principles 
of the international community to understand and justify the notion that 
certain legal norms embody principles that are fundamental to the 
international community. The legal norms that are fundamental in the 
relevant sense would, under the present conception, be precisely those that 
parties agree to under conditions of fairness and impartiality in a 
constructed initial choice situation that models precisely these 
circumstances. The principles they would articulate in this situation would 
likely to a large extent overlap with those fundamental principles protected 
by customary rules of international law that have come to be accepted as 
giving rise to peremptory legal consequences. 
This initial choice situation pays deference to what may justly be called 
a global political culture that is grounded in the statist reality of 
international law and politics. It does so by representing these 
circumstances in the choice of peoples
119
 as deliberating parties, and in the 
principles of which they deliberate the interpretation, that is, those 
stemming from the history and usages of international law and practice. 
Rawls draws on the history and usages of international law and practice as 
a stockpile of principles and ideas from which to start the process of 
adjustment that leads to eventual reflective equilibrium and articulation of 
the eight principles.
120
 In order to arrive at reflective equilibrium we adjust 
a principle so as to agree with our considered moral intuitions, and revisit 
 
 
 119. Rawls uses the term ―a people‖ as a term of art. This will be explained further below. 
 120. RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 41–41:  
Thus, in the argument in the original position at the second level I consider the merits of only 
the eight principles of the Law of Peoples . . . . These familiar and largely traditional 
principles I take from the history and usages of international law and practice. The parties are 
not given a menu of alternative principles and ideals from which to select, as they are in 
Political Liberalism, or in A Theory of Justice. Rather, the representatives of well-ordered 
peoples simply reflect on the advantages of these principles of equality among peoples and 
see no reason to depart from them or to propose alternatives. These principles must, of course, 
satisfy the criterion of reciprocity, since this criterion holds at both levels—both between 
citizens as citizens and peoples as peoples . . . .  
. . . .  
. . . [T]he eight principles are open to different interpretations. It is these interpretations, of 
which there are many, that are to be debated in the second-level original position.  
Id. Compare the availability of a ―menu‖ in the domestic original position and the original position as 
a ―selection device.‖ See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 83 (ERIN KELLY ed., 
2001). See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). See also Beitz, supra note 90, at 
675 (discussing choosing principles of justice). 
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our intuition where it seems aberrant from the principle.
121
 We adjust the 
conditions of the initial choice situation until we agree, in wide and 
general reflective equilibrium, how to situate the participants in the 
bargaining situation.
122
 
The position in the law of peoples is realistic (but not to be confused 
with Rawls‘s presentation of the law of peoples as a ―realistic utopia‖123) 
to the extent that it is modeled to apply to an international ―basic 
structure‖ that most certainly would contain national borders and political 
associations. The existence of borders is desirable in certain ways: 
[I]t is surely . . . a good for individuals and associations to be 
attached to their particular culture and to take part in its common 
public and civic life. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . [This] argues for preserving significant room for the idea of a 
people‘s self-determination and for some kind of loose or 
confederative form of a Society of Peoples.
124
 
On one view the policies that peremptory legal consequences in 
international law seek to protect have historical and cultural roots that 
mirror the European tradition. Jennings, for instance, saw these traditions 
mirrored in much of the entire corpus of international law.
125
 The political 
constructivist conception of international justice in the Rawlsian tradition 
requires reflection on the history and usages of international law and 
practice as we find it. Yet this initial stockpile of principles stemming 
from history and usage in international law sits within a European heritage 
that long controlled the development of international law.
126
 That much 
seems clear as a historical fact. However, this circumstance is not 
objectionable in itself, and does not provide a knock-out argument against 
Rawls‘s method, so long as we agree on a modeling of the initial choice 
situation that yields an articulation of the law of peoples that all peoples‘ 
representatives can endorse from within their respective traditions. 
 
 
 121. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18–19 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 6 (―The idea of this society is realistically utopian in 
that it depicts an achievable social world that combines political right and justice for all liberal and 
decent peoples in a Society of Peoples.‖). 
 124. Id. at 61. See generally Leif Wenar, Why Rawls is Not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian, in 
RAWLS‘S LAW OF PEOPLES: A REALISTIC UTOPIA 95, 102–04 (Rex Martin and David A. Reidy eds., 
2006).  
 125. See generally Jennings, supra note 6. 
 126. Id. 
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Rawls is also careful to set up the second original position so as to 
represent peoples and not states.
127
 In Rawls‘s view, peoples conceive 
themselves as free and equal and possess the moral character
128
 necessary 
to permit participation through their representatives in the second original 
position, and to choose principles that are reasonable rather than merely 
rational. States, says Rawls, are rationally motivated but do not act 
reasonably.
129
 Peoples—a normative concept in Rawls‘s account—also 
―lack traditional sovereignty‖ in the sense that international law has 
conceived of sovereignty ―for the three centuries after the Thirty Years‘ 
War (1618–1648).‖130 All the while, Rawls uses the term ―a people‖ as a 
term of art,
131
 that is, as a normative idea rather than as a physical 
description. 
The second original position mirrors the first in its fair and equal 
situation of representatives: ―[b]oth the parties as representatives and the 
peoples they represent are situated symmetrically and therefore fairly.‖132 
The choice of peoples as the relevant moral unit leads to a form of liberal 
statism.
133
 There are conceptual arguments that justify this connection. 
According to Wenar: 
A global original position will select principles for institutions of 
the global basic structure. Since these global institutions will be 
coercive, they will also have to meet the fundamental standard of 
legitimacy. . . . [T]he global public political culture is primarily 
international, not interpersonal. The ideas that regulate the 
institutions of global society are concerned primarily with the nature 
of nations and their proper relations—not with the nature of persons 
and their proper relations. . . . It is peoples, not individuals, that 
 
 
 127. RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 17. See also Beitz, supra note 90, at 679 (―The idea of a 
people is part of an ideal conception of the social world and not simply a redescription of a familiar 
phenomenon. . . . States qua states are concerned with the advancement of their rational interests, 
whereas peoples have a moral nature that limits the pursuit of these interests. For peoples, as for moral 
persons, the reasonable constrains the rational. Peoples, therefore, also differ from states in not 
claiming the traditional powers of sovereignty.‖). 
 128. RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 27–30, 33. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 25. 
 131. Alyssa Bernstein, Kant, Rawls and Cosmopolitanism: Toward Perpetual Peace and the Law 
of Peoples, 17 JAHRBUCH FÜR RECHT UND ETHIK [ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ETHICS] 3, 42–43 
(2009).  
 132. RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 32. 
 133. However this term is slightly misleading because Rawls specifically does not represent the 
political scientist‘s conception of a state in the initial choice situation. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND PEREMPTORY NORMS 33 
 
 
 
 
international political institutions regard as free and equal, and this 
is why Rawls makes peoples the subject of his global political 
theory.
134
 
There is something to be said for the articulation of a model of 
representation that pays deference to the history and continued reality of 
international law and relations. Going beyond Rawls‘s use of ―a people‖ 
as a normative term of art, the notion of a people as a unit with legal 
identity today occupies a place in international law, specifically since 
peoples are the direct beneficiaries of the legal right to self-determination. 
This right has ―become one of the most potent political slogans of our 
time,‖135 though not without generating political and academic 
controversy.
136
 Notable among judicial pronouncements upon the status of 
self-determination in international law is the ICJ‘s East Timor137 
judgment, as well as the Court‘s advisory opinions in South West Africa,138 
Western Sahara
139
 and Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory.
140
 The notion of a people as a morally relevant social unit 
 
 
 134. Wenar, supra note 124, at 102–03. 
 135. Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination Today: The Metamorphosis of an Ideal, 19 ISR. L. 
REV. 310, 310 (1984). 
 136. Id. (―It is perhaps not surprising that discussions of self-determination in the media and the 
UN have been characterized by confusion, misunderstandings and oversimplification. But woolly 
thinking on the subject is also common in academic circles, where one might expect more rigorous 
analysis to prevail. At root, the misunderstandings derive from a common basic premise: that to invoke 
the right of self-determination is to give the solution to a problem. This premise, however, is 
fallacious.‖) (footnote omitted). 
 137. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 (June 30) (―In the Court‘s view, 
Portugal‘s assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved from the Charter and 
from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable. The principle of self-
determination of peoples has been recognized by the United Nations Charter and in the jurisprudence 
of the Court . . . it is one of the essential principles of contemporary international law.‖). 
 138. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 
16, 30–31 (June 21). 
 139. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1974 I.C.J. 12, 31–32 (Oct. 16) (―The principle of self-
determination as a right of peoples, and its application for the purpose of bringing all colonial 
situations to a speedy end, were enunciated in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In this resolution the 
General Assembly proclaims ‗the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism 
in all its forms and manifestations.‘ . . . The above provisions [of the Declaration], in particular 
paragraph 2, thus confirm and emphasize that the application of the right of self-determination requires 
a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned.‖). 
 140. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 184 (July 9) (―That construction, along with measures taken 
previously, thus severely impedes the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-
determination, and is therefore a breach of Israel‘s obligation to respect that right.‖). See also id. at 197 
(―The Court notes that Israel is first obliged to comply with the international obligations it has 
breached by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory . . . . Consequently, 
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arguably also played a controlling role in the twentieth-century 
decolonization efforts.
141
 
Political constructivism provides a method by which we can account 
for the suggestion that certain legal norms protect fundamental principles 
of the international community. International law embraced the concept 
and operation of peremptory legal consequences in order to offer possible 
means for the special legal protection of these fundamental principles. 
There is thus a relationship between the policy of legally safeguarding 
fundamental international principles and a basic charter of such principles. 
However, we must be able to say with confidence which principles are of 
fundamental importance to the international community. Social contract 
theory and political constructivism more generally offer a starting point 
for reasoning in this direction. 
B. Some Shortcomings in Rawls’s Law of Peoples as an Approach 
Human rights play a fundamental role in Rawls‘s law of peoples and, 
ultimately, in his interpretation of the development of international law. 
Certain commentators have raised the question whether Rawls‘s modeling 
of the second original position may, while fitting the assumptions about 
international society that focus on social collectivities as basic building 
blocks, rely on a unit of deliberation that overlooks the primacy of the 
individual.
142
 The increasing relevance of the individual in international 
 
 
Israel is bound to comply with its obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination and its obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights 
law.‖). 
 141. See especially Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/L.323) (Dec. 14, 1960). See also Claudia Saladin, Self-
Determination, Minority Rights, and Constitutional Accommodation: The Example of the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic, Note, 13 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 172, 179–80 (1991–1992) (―Self-determination 
and minority rights became prominent in international relations in the aftermath of World War I. 
President Wilson believed that the concepts of self-determination and democracy were intimately 
related. He considered external freedom from alien sovereignty meaningless without a continuing 
process of self-government internally. Conversely, if a regime were democratic, then external self-
determination became peripheral. To Wilson‘s mind the minority regime became necessary only in the 
absence of true self-government. As he conceived it, the principle of self-determination had the 
protection of minorities as a corollary. He originally proposed that an article on minorities be inserted 
in the League of Nations Covenant but, instead, minority rights were dealt with in territorial treaties 
guaranteed by the League.‖) (footnotes omitted). 
 142. See Beitz, supra note 90, at 681. The author further notes:  
Even if we agree about the state‘s significance as a mechanism for the efficient management 
of resources over time and the resulting need to elicit peoples‘ willing support, it does not 
follow that domestic societies have an ethical status separate from that of their members taken 
severally. All that follows is that domestic societies, or at least societies of a certain limited 
scale and internal composition, are advantageous constituent elements of global society. . . . It 
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law is reflected in human rights concerns that take shape in the various 
multilateral human rights instruments. Something may be amiss in a law 
of peoples in which the basic participants with primary relevance in the 
initial choice situation are social constructs with a corporate identity.
143
 
Although peoples guarantee human rights domestically (by stipulation), 
the result is a law of peoples in which a human rights principle is 
presupposed, so that it is not necessary, strictly speaking, to formulate 
such a principle as part of the law of peoples itself. Rawls himself says 
that the principle of the law of peoples that ―peoples ought to honor human 
rights‖ is superfluous, because all subjects of the law of peoples do so as a 
condition of being a participant in the law of peoples.
144
 The law of 
peoples, in ideal theory at least, becomes a body of principles governing 
the interaction of rights-protecting collectivities, rather than a set of 
principles in which a human rights principle is free-standing. That is not to 
say that individuals are not of moral concern. Indeed, moral concern for 
the individual domestically provides a people with its entitlement to the 
rights of members of the Society of Peoples. Thus ultimately Rawls‘s law 
of peoples is based on respect for the individual.
145
 Human rights, as 
understood in the law of peoples, are particularly urgent rights. Among 
other things they ―restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct 
 
 
is a commonplace that the size of the circle of affinity is historically variable and that, under 
favorable institutional and cultural circumstances, the range of sympathetic concern can 
extend well beyond those with whom people share any particular ascriptive characteristics . . . 
But if motivational capacities are variable and subject to change with the development of 
institutions and cultures, then it gets things backward to assume any particular limitations on 
these capacities in the structure of a political theory. This is what occurs, perhaps 
nonobviously, when the primacy of peoples is built into the original position. Alternatively, a 
theory could treat motivational constraints as variables to which a theory should be sensitive 
in its application to the nonideal world. But on that approach, the rationale for beginning with 
peoples would disappear. 
 Id. at 683 (internal citations omitted). See also Allen Buchanan, Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a 
Vanished Westphalian World, 110 ETHICS 697, 698 (2000) (―To say that the parties represent peoples 
is, in effect, to ensure that the fundamental principles of international law that will be chosen reflect 
the interest of those who support the dominant or official conception of the good or of justice in the 
society, and this may mean that the interests of dissident individuals or minorities are utterly 
disregarded.‖). 
 143. See Boucher, supra note 91, at 25 (―For Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel states are corporate 
moral persons with rights and duties different from those of individual persons. They are the creation 
of the individuals who comprise them, and states exercise on their behalf the duties that those 
individuals have to humankind as a whole. For Vattel the state is a deliberative agent having ‗an 
understanding and a will peculiar to itself‘. For Rawls it is peoples, acting through their 
representatives, who have this moral capacity.‖) (footnotes omitted). 
 144. RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 37. 
 145. See Bernstein, supra note 131, at 16. 
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and specify limits to a regime‘s internal autonomy.‖146 Moreover, the force 
of human rights as political/moral rights binds outlaw states as well, since 
when they violate human rights they expose themselves to condemnation 
and intervention.
147
 Thus peoples are methodologically primary, but not 
morally primary. All that granted, there may yet be something to be said 
for a law of peoples in which individuals are also methodologically 
primary. 
There is a further issue raised by Rawls‘s method. In the deliberative 
stage of the second original position, peoples‘ representatives do not 
pursue the articulation of principles from a full menu of available options 
from which they are free to choose some and reject others.
148
 Their 
deliberation, which merely involves deciding upon an interpretation of 
principles that are given to them, is intimately tied to the ―history and 
usages of international law and practice,‖149 and peoples‘ representatives 
only deliberate the interpretation of these eight given principles. Peoples‘ 
options are far more limited than are those of their equivalents at the 
domestic level, and Rawls gives peoples no latitude fully to recast the 
basic principles of international law even should they so agree. 
Again, as Rawls conceives of his ―eight principles‖ of the law of 
peoples, they partially overlap with peremptory norms. However, these 
principles may reflect the inequality of power relations that are possibly 
part of the international law tradition—after all these biases may well be 
embedded in this initial stockpile of principles of which peoples‘ 
representatives merely deliberate the interpretation. 
The second original position represents peoples; thus, for purposes of 
developing the law of peoples Rawls methodologically subordinates, in a 
certain sense, individual natural persons. However, individuals are not 
thereby subordinated morally, because the modeling assumes that liberal 
peoples and decent peoples offer sufficient human rights guarantees 
domestically. Therefore, the law of peoples can properly be described as 
liberal. Of course, setting up a device of representation that models 
peoples as the basic unit is a function of the questions Rawls is asking, 
namely: (1) How are we to arrive at principles of justice appropriate to 
govern the relations between well-ordered peoples? (2) How are we to 
secure peace and respect for human rights? (3) When is intervention on 
humanitarian grounds justified? In Rawls‘s ―non-ideal‖ theory, a further 
 
 
 146. Id. at 37. 
 147. Id. at 33. 
 148. RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 41. 
 149. Id. 
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question arises: how are we to articulate principles of international justice 
to govern the relationship of well-ordered peoples towards non-well-
ordered peoples? For an international legal order that is increasingly 
cognizant of individuals as relevant subjects, it may be necessary to 
nuance Rawls‘s questions to reflect the less state-centric realities of 
international law. 
International human rights instruments—especially regional human 
rights treaties and courts, notably the European Convention on Human 
Rights
150
 (―ECHR‖) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(―ECtHR‖)—create more subject-inclusive regimes in international law, in 
which individuals in certain circumstances have the legal capacity to 
qualify as right-holders. In the case of the ECHR, individuals also enjoy 
standing to bring cases to the ECtHR, thus granting them powers to 
enforce their claims.
151
 
Although the outcome may be the same (since, again, liberal and 
decent peoples guarantee human rights domestically) there is something 
more immediate in an original position that takes individuals as the basic 
unit of representation. Perhaps it would even better reflect the aspirational 
state of development in international human rights law today. Moreover, 
the policies underlying norms with peremptory character, all foster basic 
forms of human well-being. Again, peremptory legal consequences 
typically attach to basic human rights norms and norms protecting 
international peace and security. 
Perhaps the essential question, and one open to endless interpretation, 
is what this international ―basic structure‖ looks like.152 A century ago we 
could have answered this question with great confidence: states and their 
legal relations constituted the international basic structure. Perhaps the 
state of limbo we find ourselves in concerning the basic structure of 
international law today may make Rawls‘s position appear comparatively 
conservative in its method.
153
 His is a more traditional starting position, 
 
 
 150. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 151. In the case of most other human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, individuals do not have legal capacity to initiate proceedings against states 
directly or to bring claims in international courts. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 
moreover, is not a legally binding instrument. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. 
Doc. A/777 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 152. Rawls discusses the idea of the international basic structure. See RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra 
note 14, at 61–62. 
 153. However recall that Rawls makes a deliberate choice to represent peoples rather than states, 
precisely because of peoples‘ moral characteristics. 
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but one from which he takes us to where we would like to end up as far as 
human rights are concerned. 
The bottom line for the purposes of shedding light on the 
fundamentality of certain principles to the international community is that 
an initial choice situation that is not realistic enough to fit the basic tenets 
of the international legal and political order may also turn out 
unsatisfactory as means for understanding the fundamentality of principles 
underlying those legal norms typically associated with peremptory legal 
consequences. After all, too great a focus on the role of the individual in 
international relations may simply take insufficient account of the 
primordial role of the state in the progressive development of international 
legal rules and principles.
154
 
On the other hand, in a world in which J.S. Mill‘s ―common 
sympathies,‖155 one of the criteria on which Rawls bases the moral 
characteristics of peoples as opposed to states, are perhaps slowly being 
eroded,
156
 we might question the meaningfulness of peoples as the basic 
 
 
 154. See, e.g., Philip Pettit, Rawls’s Peoples, in RAWLS‘S LAW OF PEOPLES: A REALISTIC UTOPIA 
38, 38 (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy eds., 2006). 
 155. See RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 23–24 (―Liberal peoples have three basic features: a 
reasonably just constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental interests; citizens 
united by what Mill called ―common sympathies‖; and finally, a moral nature.‖). See id. at 24 (―As for 
a liberal people being united by common sympathies and a desire to be under the same democratic 
government, if those sympathies were entirely dependent upon a common language, history, and 
political culture, with a shared historical consciousness, this feature would rarely, if ever, be fully 
satisfied. Historical conquests and immigration have caused the intermingling of groups with different 
cultures and historical memories who now reside within the territory of most contemporary democratic 
governments. Notwithstanding, the Law of Peoples starts with the need for common sympathies, no 
matter what their source may be.‖). If Rawls is ready to concede the ―weakness‖ of this criterion and 
the uncertainty of its source, why is he not willing to doubt the criterion itself? It is not clear why 
common sympathies should be presumed to be a binding force, the strength of which is liable to 
erosion. 
 156. See, e.g., Beitz, supra note 90, at 680. Increasing social mobility and the associated 
movement of persons through immigration and emigration may undermine the plausibility of a 
people‘s ―moral‖ character, indeed weakens the idea of a people itself, even as a term of art. See also 
Pomerance, supra note 135, at 311–12 (―First and foremost, there is need to define the bearer of the 
right. Who is the ‗self‘ to whom self-determination attaches? Is it Biafra or Nigeria? Northern Ireland, 
Ireland or the United Kingdom together with Northern Ireland? The present population of Taiwan 
(consisting mainly of Nationalist Chinese), the indigenous islanders, or Communist China? Gibraltar 
or Spain? The Falkland Islanders or the Argentine nation which claims the Islands as part of its 
patrimony? The Kurds, or, respectively, Iraq, Iran, the Soviet Union, and Turkey?‖). The fact of 
reasonable pluralism, which the Rawlsian liberal theory of international political justice seeks to 
accommodate, will produce disagreement over the idea of a people—though admittedly the same 
uncertainty surrounds the individual person ―politically conceived.‖ The suggested above criteria for 
the ascertainment of social cohesion sufficient to warrant the label ―people‖ are comparatively ―weak‖ 
compared to the more immediately reasonable and innate moral character of the individual in the 
liberal perspective. See also Buchanan, supra note 142, at 698 (―The problem is not simply that by 
having the parties represent peoples (or rather dominant societal views), Rawls gives short shrift to 
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units of representation, even where that term is used as a term of art. Many 
ideas of a people will in some way be based on an arbitrary choice of 
criteria. Pettit, for instance, argues that Rawls builds a ―geography [in]to 
justice.‖157 This is not true though, since geography is not necessary to 
understand Rawls‘s conception of a people as a representational unit in the 
original position. Moreover, peoples in actual fact need not be 
geographically defined. Again, Rawls uses the term ―people‖ as a 
normative term of art.
158
 Nevertheless, the idea must be grounded in some 
political reality in order to remain meaningful. 
Reasonable differences in value-preferences are clearly a fact of 
international political life.
159
 These values can clash. The ―fact of 
reasonable pluralism‖ is a circumstance of the international community.160 
If pluralism is more pronounced internationally than domestically, we 
must be all the more careful before we can claim of a legal norm that it is 
representative of a principle of fundamental importance to the 
international community, as courts and scholars habitually do when 
discussing peremptory norms. Rawls offers us one way of thinking about 
what it means to say that a principle is of fundamental importance to the 
 
 
dissenting individuals and minorities. There is, in fact, an additional reason why a moral theory of 
international law that only reflects the perspective of ‗peoples‘ must be inadequate. At least in the 
modern world, individuals often do not live their whole lives in the society into which they are born. 
What this means is that there is a need for principles that track individuals across borders—principles 
that specify the rights that individuals have irrespective of which society they happen to belong to, and 
which reflect the independence of individuals from any particular society.‖). See also Pogge, supra 
note 95, at 197–98 (―I do not believe that the notion of ‗a people‘ is clear enough and significant 
enough in the human world to play the conceptual role and to have the moral significance that Rawls 
assigns to it. In many parts of the globe, official borders do not correlate with the main characteristics 
that are normally held to identify a people or a nation—such as common ethnicity, language, culture, 
history, tradition. Moreover, whether some group does or does not constitute a people would seem, in 
important ways, to be a matter of more-or-less rather than either-or. . . . Second, I do not believe that 
Rawls has an adequate response to the historical arbitrariness of national borders—to the fact that most 
borders have come about through violence and coercion.‖). 
 157. See Pettit, supra note 154, at 49, 46–47. 
 158. See Bernstein, supra note 131. 
 159. RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 11.  
 160. Id. (―In the Society of Peoples, the parallel to reasonable pluralism is the diversity among 
reasonable peoples with their different cultures and traditions of thought, both religious and 
nonreligious.‖). See also id. at 16 (―Because religious, philosophical, or moral unity is neither possible 
nor necessary for social unity, if social stability is not merely a modus vivendi, it must be rooted in a 
reasonable political conception of right and justice affirmed by an overlapping consensus of 
comprehensive doctrines.‖). Rawls speaks of an overlapping consensus as an element of a political 
theory of liberalism that is capable of finding endorsement by individuals of a society who have 
reasonable disagreements on the appropriate roles for institutions stemming from the ―fact of 
reasonable pluralism,‖ including differing conceptions of the good. See generally John Rawls, The 
Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1987). 
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international community. Let us now explore more fully a contractarian 
alternative that focuses on the primacy of the individual. 
IV. ―COSMOPOLITAN LIBERALISM‖ 
A. International Law and the Individual 
The transition from the term ―law of nations‖ to ―international law‖ 
became complete in the decades following World War II. Under classical 
international law theory, only states are considered subjects of 
international law. With the rise of international organizations, notably the 
United Nations, international organizations came to be recognized as 
possessing international legal personality even vis-à-vis non-member 
states of the relevant organization.
161
 Individuals are not subjects of 
international law in classical international law theory. Under this view 
they generally do not enjoy the legal capacity to qualify as potential right-
holders under international law, except in treaty-created exceptions, where 
a treaty-regime expressly vests potential claims and powers of 
enforcement in an individual. The ECtHR offers an example. Article 34 of 
the ECHR, added by Protocol 11, which entered into force in 1998, 
establishes the right of individual petition to the Court.
162
 Also, individuals 
are the beneficiaries of customary international human rights norms. 
Is the acknowledgment of individual human rights claims sufficiently 
developed to warrant reflecting the role of the individual in the basic 
structure of the international legal order, and of international political 
 
 
 161. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 
1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (April 11) (―In the opinion of the Court, the Organization [the United Nations] 
was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which 
can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international personality and 
the capacity to operate upon an international plane. It is at present the supreme type of international 
organization, and it could not carry out the intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international 
personality. It must be acknowledged that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to it, with the 
attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence required to enable those 
functions to be effectively discharged. Accordingly, the Court has come to the conclusion that the 
Organization is an international person. . . . [I]t is a subject of international law and capable of 
possessing international rights and duties, and . . . it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing 
international claims.‖). 
 162. Article 34 reads:  
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or 
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting 
Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting 
Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right. 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 34, Nov. 1, 1998, 
E.T.S. no. 155. 
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society more broadly? Human rights law, international criminal law, and 
international humanitarian law are all premised on the need for 
international law to recognize the moral claims of individual persons and, 
where necessary, to offer legal mechanisms for their enforcement. 
The development of human rights constraints on states is arguably 
unintelligible without reference to a concern for the moral worth of the 
individual. The special legal status accorded to a small group of legal 
norms, all with an overwhelmingly significant moral dimension, by 
attaching stringent legal consequences to them and thereby granting them 
the status of peremptory norms, broadly reflects this legal and political 
evolution. These international legal norms all protect basic human well-
being, either directly
163
 or indirectly.
164
 The fact that international law 
embraced the concept of peremptory legal consequences and that these 
consequences in practice almost invariably attach to human rights norms 
or norms protecting international peace and security supports the claim 
that one goal of international law in practice today is to promote human 
rights, and that this aim is not the sum of, but rather demands, the 
domestic protection of human rights. 
B. An Argument from Humanity about the Fundamental Principles of the 
International Community 
The type of philosophically informed argument about the basic 
principles of international law that builds upon egalitarian individualism 
and the moral irrelevance of nationality and borders is in certain respects 
associated with the school of cosmopolitanism.
165
 Colloquially, the word 
 
 
 163. For instance, the prohibitions under international law respectively of torture or of genocide 
protect human well-being directly. See for example, R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary 
Magistrate and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, for pronouncements on 
the peremptory character of the prohibition of torture under international law. See also Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002), 2006 I.C.J. at 30–31(noting that the 
prohibition of genocide under international law has peremptory character). 
 164. For instance, the right to self-determination of peoples or the prohibition of the use of force 
under international law protect human well-being in a more indirect sense. See State Responsibility, 
supra note 2, at 85 (suggesting that the right to self-determination is peremptory); Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 100 (suggesting that the prohibition of 
the use of force may have peremptory character). 
 165. See Beitz, supra note 90, at 677 (―At the deepest level, cosmopolitan liberalism regards the 
social world as composed of persons, not collectivities like societies or peoples, and insists that 
principles for the relations of societies should be based on a consideration of the fundamental interests 
of persons.‖). On the notion and origins of cosmopolitanism, see generally KWAME A. APPIAH, 
COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS (2006).  
Cosmopolitanism dates at least to the Cynics of the fourth century BC, who first coined the 
expression cosmopolitan, ―citizen of the cosmos.‖ The formulation was meant to be 
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cosmopolitan ―can suggest an unpleasant posture of superiority toward the 
putative provincial.‖166 However, the term also has relevant philosophical 
significance. Appiah, for instance, writes: 
So there are two strands that intertwine in the notion of 
cosmopolitanism. One is the idea that we have obligations to others, 
obligations that stretch beyond those to whom we are related by the 
ties of kith and kind, or even the more formal ties of a shared 
citizenship. The other is that we take seriously the value not just of 
human life but of particular human lives, which means taking an 
interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance.
167
 
Appiah further notes that ―cosmopolitanism shouldn‘t be seen as some 
exalted attainment: it begins with the simple idea that in the human 
community, as in national communities, we need to develop habits of 
coexistence. . . .‖168 In contractarianism, the cosmopolitan position can 
describe a posture that endows the individual with primary moral and 
methodological relevance, notably, where applicable, in the initial choice 
situation that leads to the articulation of basic principles of justice. 
The cosmopolitan conviction, which treats the commonalities between 
individuals as more deserving than the largely necessary but coincidental 
state, ethnic or other cultural or political borders,
169
 may lead to a different 
 
 
paradoxical, and reflected the general Cynic skepticism toward custom and tradition. A 
citizen—a politēs—belonged to a particular polis, a city to which he or she owed loyalty. The 
cosmos referred to the world, not in the sense of the earth, but in the sense of the universe. 
Talk of cosmopolitanism originally signaled, then, a rejection of the conventional view that 
every civilized person belonged to a community among communities. The creed was taken up 
and elaborated by the Stoics, beginning in the third century BC, and that fact proved of critical 
importance in its subsequent intellectual history. For the Stoicism of the Romans—Cicero, 
Seneca, Epictetus, and the emperor Marcus Aurelius—proved congenial to many Christian 
intellectuals, once Christianity became the religion of the Roman Empire. . . . 
Cosmopolitanism‘s later career wasn‘t without distinction. It underwrote some of the great 
moral achievements of the Enlightenment, including the 1789 ―Declaration of the Rights of 
Man‖ and Immanuel Kant‘s work proposing a ―league of nations.‖ 
 Id. at xiv. 
 166. Id. at xiii. 
 167. Id. at xv. Historically the attitudes associated with cosmopolitanism have been rendered the 
object of celebration and of scorn:  
Both Hitler and Stalin—who agreed about little else, save that murder was the first instrument 
of politics—launched regular invectives against ―rootless cosmopolitans‖; and while, for 
both, anti-cosmopolitanism was often just a euphemism for anti-Semitism, they were right to 
see cosmopolitanism as their enemy. For they both required a kind of loyalty to one portion of 
humanity—a nation, a class—that ruled out loyalty to all of humanity. 
 Id. at xvi.  
 168. Id. at xviii–xix. 
 169. See RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 39. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] POLITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND PEREMPTORY NORMS 43 
 
 
 
 
approach to the international original position in the social contract theory 
approach. The cosmopolitan would set up an international original 
position that places the individual at the center of the method, by making 
individuals the basic participants in this initial choice situation. By 
contrast, in Rawls‘s account of the law of peoples, writes Beitz, ―peoples 
are . . . ethically primary: it is peoples, not persons, which are represented 
in the international original position, and it is the interests of peoples 
considered as collective entities, not those of individual persons, that 
determine the choice of principles for the international conduct of 
states.‖170 While this claim is too broad, since Rawls‘s law of peoples is 
supremely concerned with individual human rights, the initial choice 
situation that represents individuals offers an alternative way to 
incorporate human rights principles into a theoretical framework of 
principles of international justice. 
Rawls argues that an original position in which individuals are the 
basic units of deliberation—i.e., a strictly cosmopolitan one—risks 
yielding principles of international justice that would not admit of 
anything less than liberal peoples. Rawls further claims that it would then 
be morally permissible for liberal peoples to adopt foreign policy choices 
the aim of which would be ―to shape all not yet liberal societies in a liberal 
direction, until eventually (in the ideal case) all societies are liberal.‖171 
Nonetheless, it is not clear that a moral license to espouse foreign policies 
that target non-liberal peoples would be a necessary consequence of the 
cosmopolitan position. Nor is it fully clear, as Rawls suggests, that 
cosmopolitan justice assumes that all persons should have the rights they 
enjoy as citizens in a constitutional democracy and that for that reason the 
cosmopolitan position assumes that any less-than-liberal people cannot be 
tolerated.
172
 Moreover, there are well-founded pragmatic concerns that any 
moral license to intervene against any other non-liberal people (or state) 
either on its territory or through other policies for humanitarian purposes is 
open to abuse. It is of course possible to restrict any such moral license 
through procedural and institutional safeguards. 
The legal position on the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention in 
international law remains ambiguous. To take one example of this 
argument in practice, in the ICJ proceedings brought by Serbia and 
Montenegro in connection with NATO‘s 1999 bombing campaign in 
 
 
 170. See Beitz, supra note 90, at 678. 
 171. RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 60, 82. 
 172. Id. at 82–83. Some commentators do regard Rawls‘s law of peoples as cosmopolitan in 
relevant respects. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 131, at 59. 
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Kosovo Belgium argued as a one reason why the Court should not in any 
event indicate provisional measures the ―serious effects which such 
measures would have on the outcome of the humanitarian crisis caused by 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Kosovo and in neighbouring 
countries.‖173 
At times intervention clearly seems justified from a moral point of 
view to the extent that intervention may actually protect a population‘s 
human rights.
174
 There seems at times to be a gap between the moral 
justification for intervention and its legal permissibility. The emerging 
international law doctrine of the ―responsibility to protect‖ seeks to narrow 
this gap.
175
 The legal notion of a ―responsibility to protect‖ was arguably 
applied in the 2011 military intervention in Libya under Security Council 
Resolution 1973. 
While it is uncertain whether, from a legal point of view, humanitarian 
grounds offer an intervening state a defense against what would otherwise 
be a breach of the prohibition of the use of force—a peremptory norm no 
less—and of the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of 
another state,
176
 any such defense as there may be becomes somewhat 
more credible where the mandate for intervention is channeled through an 
international organ, such as the United Nations Security Council. 
Cosmopolitan liberalism privileges human rights out of respect for the 
individual over collective or social concerns. The cosmopolitan initial 
choice situation, in which representatives of individuals deliberate 
 
 
 173. Legality of the Use of Force (Serb. & Mont. v. Belg.), Order, 1999 I.C.J. 124, 131 (June 2). 
The Court however did not address this argument. 
 174. See FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND 
MORALITY 26–31 (1988). See generally id. at 29–30 (―Many communities have conquered their 
freedom with outside help—history abounds in examples. Conversely, all too frequently peoples are 
subjugated and subject to unspeakable suffering as the result of processes of pure self-determination. 
Take the example of the 1971 takeover in Uganda by Idi Amin. . . . The ‗self‘ (the Ugandan people) 
did not ―determine‖ anything. The ‗self‘ here is not the real people, but some mystical entity called the 
‗nation‘ which ―determines itself‖ through the ‗political process‘. . . . Many persons enjoy human 
rights as a result of liberating foreign intervention. Consequently, the assertion that without self-
determination (that is, with foreign intervention) the rest of human rights are meaningless is 
contradicted by the facts.‖) (footnotes omitted). 
 175. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 
16, 2005). 
 176. Both rules are restated, notably, in the U.N. General Assembly Declaration on Principles of 
Friendly Relations. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 
(XXV), at 122, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Oct. 24, 1970) (―States shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.‖). Article 1 also codifies the 
principle of self-determination: ―Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which 
deprives peoples . . . of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence.‖ Id. at 123. 
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principles of justice for the international community, need not assume 
individual rights in the way a natural law theorist might. Indeed, showing 
that rights are the outcome of the bargaining process under conditions of 
fairness, rather than a presupposition, would greatly bolster their 
philosophical credibility.
177
 Again, it is not evident why a conception of 
liberal cosmopolitan justice would direct the foreign policy of liberal 
peoples towards the liberalization of all non-liberal peoples through the 
formers‘ foreign policies.178 
Cosmopolitan liberalism appeals to our intuitions and initial 
assumptions in several ways as a manner of thinking about the 
fundamental nature of those principles afforded special protection through 
peremptory legal consequences in international law. But skeptical voices 
remain with respect to the possibility of cosmopolitan values. Luban, for 
instance, notes: 
[A]s a matter of principle, states owe it to their people to favor 
national interests over cosmopolitan ones—and so states will 
advance international human rights only to the extent that the 
advancement of human rights is widely perceived by their people as 
a national interest. By its very nature, the community of states 
cannot properly accommodate the interests of humanity.
179
 
 
 
 177. See Fernando R. Tesón, International Obligation and the Theory of Hypothetical Consent, 15 
YALE J. INT‘L L. 84, 110–11 (1990). 
 178. See RAWLS, PEOPLES, supra note 14, at 48 (―The Society of Peoples needs to develop new 
institutions and practices under the Law of Peoples to constrain outlaw states when they appear. 
Among these new practices should be the promotion of human rights: it should be a fixed concern of 
the foreign policy of all just and decent regimes.‖). See also id. at 60 (―[T]he guiding principle of 
liberal foreign policy is gradually to shape all not yet liberal societies in a liberal direction . . . .‖). It is 
here that the limits of the principle of toleration, which must be a feature of the law of peoples, are 
generally tested. Id. at 19 (―The effect of extending a liberal conception of justice to the Society of 
Peoples, which encompasses many more religious and other comprehensive doctrines than any single 
people, makes it inevitable that, if member peoples employ public reason in their dealings with one 
another, toleration must follow.‖). On Rawls‘s understanding of the principle of toleration in the law 
of peoples, see id. at 59 (―To tolerate also means to recognize these nonliberal societies as equal 
participating members in good standing of the Society of Peoples, with certain rights and obligations, 
including the duty of civility requiring that they offer other peoples public reasons appropriate to the 
Society of Peoples for their actions.‖). 
 179. Luban, supra note 13, at 131. See also id. at 132–33 (―[I]t is one thing to place a premium on 
human rights in one‘s own society, another to place a premium on human rights in someone else‘s, and 
a third thing altogether to insist on an international law principle of human rights—a principle that 
might constrain foreign policy decisions reached through democratic means . . . . Every liberal society 
will honor human rights; that is what makes it liberal. But it does not follow that the principle of 
honoring human rights must belong to the Law of Peoples rather than to the domestic laws of peoples. 
. . . But why will I have reason to insist that other nations respect the human rights of their own 
nationals? . . . [I]t is far from self-evident, to say the least, that any liberal democratic people would 
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As the various approaches to the hypothetical contracting situation above 
have indicated, such a skeptical approach with respect to human rights 
interests and national vis-à-vis international interests is not a trump card. 
So far, we have seen that a social contract approach can help us understand 
what it means to say that an international legal norm embodies a principle 
that is of fundamental importance to the international community. We 
have also seen that political constructivism offers tools that enable us to 
determine which norms are fundamental to the international community 
given the fact of reasonable pluralism in international society. At the same 
time, one must recognize the central importance that basic human rights 
norms play, regardless of what model of the initial choice situation—
―cosmopolitan‖ or ―social‖—we espouse.180  
V. SOME CONSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PEREMPTORY NORMS 
Peremptory norms in international law do not form a ―constitution‖ of 
international law. Rather, the term ―peremptory norm‖ is a technical one 
that describes the special range of legal consequences that certain norms of 
customary international law give rise to. These legal consequences are 
available so that certain customary norms can enjoy a greater degree of 
legal protection. We have used the tools of social contract theory and of 
political constructivism generally to approach the question of what it 
means to claim that a norm is fundamental in the way associated with all 
currently accepted peremptory norms.
181
 We have not used the tools of 
social contract theory and of political constructivism to offer a theory of 
peremptory norms generally, or of international law generally, notably 
with respect to the reasons for states‘ obligations or to the constitution of 
the international legal system.  
Any ―constitution,‖ so to speak, in international law would bear 
precious little resemblance to domestic constitutions both in form and in 
substance. Verdross and Simma suggest the possibility of an international 
―constitution,‖ based on implicit ―formless consent‖ at the emergence of 
the community of independent and sovereign states.
182
 Some suggest the 
 
 
actually choose this as a clause in the social contract, let alone that the clause is a requirement of 
reason.‖). 
 180. See generally Beitz, supra note 90. 
 181. We must bear in mind that this political constructivist approach by no means answers all 
questions. Nor does it allow us to disregard the central role that state practice plays, especially from an 
evidentiary point of view, in the development of peremptory norms and in the identification of 
particular peremptory norms. 
 182. See ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VÖLKERRECHT: THEORIE UND 
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U.N. Charter as a possible formal constitution.
183
 However, even an 
important multilateral treaty with near-universal membership such as the 
Charter cannot serve as a formally entrenched constitution because to look 
at it in this way would offend the pacta tertiis principle.
184
 
Verdross had already proposed the concept of a material constitution of 
international law as early as 1927.
185
 According to him the constitution of 
international law involves some form of political and legal morality 
against which all rules of public international law must be measured. 
Today, those principles that count as constitutive of the international legal 
system notably include the principle of formal equality of states, the 
principle that treaties generate legal obligations for parties to them and that 
these obligations must be executed by them in good faith, the principle 
that custom is a source of law and legal obligation and the fact that custom 
gains legal force through state practice and opinio juris.
186
 
Today, rules created by treaty and customary rules in international law 
are legally valid only so long as they do not run afoul of those customary 
norms of general international law that give rise to peremptory legal 
consequences. It is therefore with respect to these legal effects that 
peremptory norms possess characteristics that in domestic legal systems 
we tend to associate with the superior legal force of certain forms of 
legislation over others, and of constitutional rules over all other legal rules. 
 
 
PRAXIS [UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE] 59–61 (3d ed. 1984). 
 183. See, e.g., Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International 
Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 529, 533 (1998). 
 184. The pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt principle is the legal principle according to which 
two or more parties cannot by agreement impose one or more obligations or benefits upon a third party 
without its consent. The principle is codified in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 1969: ―A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its 
consent.‖ VCLT, Article 34, May 24, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 185. ALFRED VERDROSS, DIE VERFASSUNG DER VÖLKERRECHTSGEMEINSCHAFT V (1926). 
 186. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 25, at 45 (―[P]rinciples such as pacta sunt servanda, 
recognition, consent and good faith are portrayed as part of jus cogens.‖). The author, however, does 
not endorse a difference in kind, indeed denies that systemic norms have peremptory character:  
There is little utility in considering ‗structural‘ norms such as consent or good faith as part of 
public order. Not all rules which are important or even indispensable for the existence and 
operation of international law belong to the category of peremptory norms. These norms do 
not need to be qualified as peremptory in order to fulfil their functions. For example, to 
consider pacta sunt servanda as part of jus cogens would make little sense, since a treaty can 
hardly be concluded denying the very norm serving as a basis of the bindingness of treaties. 
 Id. 
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